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ABSTRACT

THE EFFECTS OF REORGANIZATION:

AN ANALYSIS

OF THE CONSOLIDATION OF LOUISIANA'S

HEALTH AND WELFARE AGENCIES

May, 1979

Mary Karen O'Brien, B.A., University of New Orleans
M.A., Louisiana State University
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts

Directed by:

In 1973,

Professor Lewis

C.

Mainzer

fifty-nine health and welfare agencies

in Louisiana were consolidated under one large umbrella

department.

Included in this consolidation were the depart-

ments of health, welfare, and hospitals; two hospitals

which operated independently of the hospital department;
and several boards and commissions.

The purpose of this

case study is to determine what effect that reorganization
has had on:

1-the structures of the reorganized agencies,

2-the personnel of those agencies, 3-the decision-making
and management procedures in the new department, H-the

v

outputs (i.e., the policies, programs and services) of the

consolidated department; and 5-the political-administrative
environment in which the department operates.

In each

instance, the question that has been asked is:

Has reorgan-

ization made any difference?
Based on the findings of this study, it cannot
be said that the Louisiana reorganization was a great

success.

It has not

saved the state millions of dollars

as its supporters predicted; nor has it resulted in improved

health and welfare services.

Nevertheless, the Louisiana

reorganization has had important consequences.

It has

given the governor greater leverage in dealing with the
state bureaucracy, and it has also allowed

a

limited

reassessment of the state's health and welfare policy.
Interestingly, the governor's espousal of reorganization
has gained him support with taxpayers as well as users
of the health-welfare system.

The poor and the needy of

the state were gratified by the governor's concern for the

quality of health and welfare services.

In addition,

blacks supported the governor's appointment of blacks to
key positions in the department.

Those appointments seemed

to symbolize the governor's commitment to greater black

participation in state government.
Thus, while it cannot be said that reorganization
has achieved all that was predicted for it, the fact is

vii

that reorganization has made a difference in Louisiana.

Whether or not the state reorganized its health and welfare
agencies obviously mattered to the governor, the legislators,
clientele, the public, and the providers of the state's

health and welfare services.

Because of this, it might be

concluded that the greatest impact of this reorganization
was not in the administrative realm, but in the political
realm.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past seventy years, administrative reor-

ganization has become

a

major field of interest for stu-

dents of public administration and state government.

The

literature is particularly rich in that it contains many
useful case studies showing how reorganization decisions
are made.

Those studies include the Inter-University

Case Program (commonly called the ICP series)

1

as well as

the collections by Harold Stein 2 and Frederick Mosher3
(the latter focuses entirely on case studies of adminis-

trative reorganization of state governments).
Most of those studies found that there is a

great deal of politics involved in making reorganization

decisions.

Contrary to the rhetoric of the early re-

formers, the question of organization structure is not

a

technical matter that political actors are content to
leave in the hands of the professional bureaucrats.

The

reason for this lies in the fact that the determination
of organization structure may be important in deciding

which interests will receive greater emphasis in the political system.

In practical terms,

this means that the

choice of organizational structure may affect decisions
on budgets, programs, or personnel.

1

Since reorganization

2

represents an attempt to change organizational structures/
one can readily understand bureaucratic reluctance to re-

organize.

And, as case studies have shown, this bureau-

cratic reluctance can produce reorganization debates which
are protracted and often very bitter.
But what happens after a reorganization plan has

been approved by a legislature?

Given the intense struggle

involved in the reorganization process, it is difficult
to believe that all combatants will accept the reorgani-

zation decision as final.

It

would seem more likely that

they will continue to fight to obtain the organizational

structures which they believe will be most beneficial to
their interests.
A

major limitation of much of the existing reor-

ganization literature is that it fails to provide
tematic analysis of the effects of reorganization.

a sys-

The

authors of the reorganization case studies seem to take
it

for granted that the intended effects of a reorganiza-

tion will actually be realized.

findings of

a

However, judging from the

follow up case study by Francis Rourke, this

assumption cannot be made.

Rourke

'

s

study focused on

the attempted reorganization of the federal employment

services.

He found that while the reorganization was

successful in achieving

a

formal change of organizational

structures, it did not alter the established patterns of

interaction between the reorganized agency and its sup-

.

.

3

porters
Thus, Rourke's study suggests that implementing a

reorganization is actually

a very

dynamic process.

Admin-

istrative agencies and their supporters are not likely to
halt their struggle against a reorganization just because
a

legislative body has formally approved it.

On the

contrary, they will probably continue their struggle
in an attempt to modify or to accommodate the organiza-

tion change.

In the long run,

is possible that a

it

systematic study of the attempt to implement

a

reorganiza-

tion will reveal additional insights into organizational

behavior
The purpose of this study is to provide a follow
up study of the 1973 Louisiana reorganization.

The pri-

mary focus will be on ascertaining how the consolidation
of fifty-nine health and welfare agencies under one large

umbrella department has affected the state's administrative system.

More specifically, the study will examine

the effect of the 1973 reorganization on:

1-the struc-

tures of the fifty-nine agencies consolidated under the

umbrella department, 2-the personnel of the consolidated
agencies, 3-the decision-making and management procedures
in the new umbrella department,

4

-the outputs

(i.e., the

programs, budget, policies, and services) of the umbrella

department, and 5-the political-administrative environment
in which the department operates.

In each instance, the

4

questions which will be asked are: Has reorganization made
any difference?

If so, what?

Data for this study will be gathered from a variety of sources.

These include: newspapers, public docu-

ments, personal observations of the writer, and interviews

with political-administrative actors.

•

5

Notes for Introduction
1.

The Inter-University Case Program has been publishing
case studies since 1951.
This series includes case
studies of all levels of government; however most of
them seem to focus on the federal level.

2.

Harold Stein, ed., Public Administration and Policy
Development: A Case Book (New York: Harcourt Brace
The Stein collection of case studies was
195?
published as part of the ICP series.
,

)

3.

.

Frederick C. Mosher, ed., Governmental Reorganization:
Cases and Commentary (New York Bobbs-Merrill 1967
:

,

)

4.

James W. Davis, Jr., The National Executive Branch
(New York: The Free Press, 1970), pp. 195-197.

5.

Francis E. Rourke, "The Politics of Administrative
Reorganization: A Case History," Journal of Politics 19
(August, 1957), 461-478.

CHAPTER
A

I

REAPPRAISAL OF THE STATE ADMINISTRATIVE
REORGANIZATION MOVEMENT
Introduction
When Edwin Edwards took office as Louisiana gov-

ernor in 1972, there was reason for the general public
to be excited.

He was the first Cajun Catholic elected

governor in modern times.
office in French!)

(He even took his oath of

Perhaps even more significant though,

was the promise of an era of reform during the coming

Edwards administration.

Louisiana had just gone through

an embarrassing period of political scandals involving

charges of links between the governor's office and organized crime figures.

To make matters worse, these scan-

dals had received national attention through a series of

articles in Life magazine.

During the 1971-72 election campaign, several of
the gubernatorial candidates had offered detailed plans

for reforming state government.

These included: admin-

istrative reorganization, constitutional revision, financial reform, and revision of the state's laws governing
the conduct of public officials.

Shortly after Governor

Edwards took office, he presented his reorganization plan
6

7

to the state legislature.

Among the areas scheduled for

reorganization was health-welfare.

His plan called for

the consolidation of fifty-nine separate health and wel-

fare agencies under one large umbrella department

(whose

commissioner would be appointed by the governor).
Edwards predicted that his consolidation plan

would result in better management of the state's health
and welfare services and in a great financial savings for
the state.

The latter claim, in particular, received a

great deal of publicity in the media.

Supposedly, the

savings would come about through the combination of over-

lapping programs and the elimination of others which were
deemed to be no longer needed.

Although most of the

governor's reorganization plan failed to be approved by
the legislature, the health-welfare consolidation was.

Even a cursory glance through the reorganization

literature shows that the recent Louisiana reorganization
was not unique.

On the contrary, that reorganization may

best be seen as part of a national reform movement which

had its beginnings in the late nineteenth century.

Its

moralistic/reformist tone as well as the promise of economies and efficiency fit into a general pattern that the
1973 Louisiana reorganization appears to follow.

There-

fore, in order to understand more fully the Louisiana re-

organization, it seems appropriate first to reexamine the
general state reorganization movement.

Questions which

.
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must be considered are: How and why did the movement de-

velop?

What were its basic objectives?

Why did it fail?

And, where is the state reorganization movement heading
in the 1970s?

Answers to these questions may give added

insight into the 1973 Louisiana reorganization.

Origins of the Movement
The growth of state government in the nineteenth century

.

The roots of the state reorganization movement can be

traced to the late nineteenth century.

Because of the

tremendous economic and urban expansion in this country,
there was pressure on state government to assume new functions in the areas of health, education and welfare.

In

response to these demands, states enacted health and sanitary codes, created boards of public health and charity,
and expanded their public education systems.

As each new

function was added, a separate agency was created to ad-

minister it.

It was not

uncommon to find several agencies

operating similar programs.

Since these were independent

agencies, they were free to pursue their own policies

regardless of how they conflicted.

As a result,

it be-

came increasingly difficult to say what state policy was.

This situation worsened as states continued to add new

functions

1

there
The heart of the problem lay in the fact that

power or auwas no one in state government with enough

9

thority to coordinate the activities of the administrative
branch.

Most people assumed that the governor was the log-

ical choice to play this role.

states'

However the legacy of the

colonial experience had left

a

deep-seated mistrust

of the governor which was reflected in most of the state

constitutions adopted in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries.

2

When the new administrative agencies were

created in the late nineteenth century, they were given
either popularly elected department heads or multi-member
boards over which the governor had very limited power.
Since few governors possessed any significant staff services

(e.g., budget making authority), the governor had

no effective means to force state agencies to coordinate

their activities.
The state legislatures were even less equipped to

control and coordinate the state bureaucracy.

The same

legacy that had led to the creation of a weak executive

system had also led to the creation of
ated by the legislative branch.

a

system domin-

When some legislatures

abused their powers, there was pressure to strip state

legislatures of their excessive powers.

In the process,

many states went too far in the other direction.

They

enacted constitutional provisions limiting the legislature to biennial sessions and prohibiting certain legis-

lative actions (for instance, incurring a state debt).
to ereThe effect of this governmental fragmentation was

.
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ate a political vacuum in state government.

According to

political scientist Allan Richards, this situation begged
for someone who could bring order to the chaos.

Political corruption and the goal of responsible government

.

That someone who filled the vacuum in state government was

the political boss; however his ascent to power was charac-

terized by

degree of political corruption previously un-

a

known in American government.

Historian Richard Hofstadter

says that it was the newspaper and magazine articles of

the Muckrakers which first exposed the widespread nature
of the corruption.

Those articles showed large corpora-

tions contributing to the political machines in return for

governmental contracts and other favors which the machines
could offer

7

As might be expected, public reaction to the corrup-

tion was swift as civic-minded citizens organized clubs to

promote good government.

Although political amateurs, they

managed to elect some reform candidates.

However lacking

strong organizational support, those candidates usually
lost to machine candidates at the next election.

g

Richard

Hofstadter suggests that beyond the election of "good men"
to office,

the reformers were not certain what they wanted

to achieve through political action.

He says that the re-

formers often spoke of wanting to:

restore a type of economic individualism and political
democracy that was widely believed to have existed
corporAmerica and to have been destroyed by the great

m
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ation and the corrupt political machine; and with that
restoration to bring back a kind of civic purity that
was also believed to have been lost. 9

Typical of the reform measures they proposed were
the direct primary, the recall, and the initiative and ref-

erendum.

These were supposed to increase citizen partici-

pation as well as strengthen citizen control over government.

The record shows that these objectives were never

realized.

10

In the end,

the reformers had overestimated

the ability of the average citizen to use such complicated

measures as the initiative and referendum and had underestimated the ability of the political bosses to adapt to

changing circumstances.

Hofstadter reported that in most

cases the bosses "found ways to deflect or to use the reforms that were meant to unseat them."
The drive for economy and efficiency

.

The creation of the

New York Bureau of Municipal Research in 1906 signaled both
a new

direction in the government reform movement and the

beginning of

a

"science" of administration.

The founders

of the research bureaus brought to the government reform

movement a more realistic, pragmatic approach to governmental problems which was not focused just on electing
"good men" to office.

According to Jane Dahlberg, this

different focus may in part be attributed to the fact that
the founders of the research bureaus had been trained in
the country's newly organized business schools.

13

The

government researchers believed that management tech-

12

niques useful in

a

use in government.

large corporation could be adapted for
They saw the creation of formal research

bureaus as a means of facilitating both the accumulation
of descriptive data about government operations and the

application of the analytical techniques and standards
borrowed from their business backgrounds.

|h

One of the concerns which the government researchers brought with them to the reform movement was an interest
in economy and efficiency.

15

In this context, the most im-

portant influence may have been Frederick Taylor's theory
Taylor's studies of the steel

of scientific management.

industry convinced him that most business inefficiency

resulted from poor utilization of resources.

Taylor

claimed that the solution lay in finding the "one best
way" to organize every work task."^

Taylor's work was enthusiastically embraced by
the government researchers.

They reasoned that if Taylor's

assumptions could produce efficiency in industry, then

application of his "one best way" to government would pro17
duce similar results.

Therefore, the government re-

searchers began directing their work toward discovering
the best way to organize each government function.
Not everyone agreed with this new direction in the

government reform movement.

Many believed that this new

direction was incompatible with the pursuit of government
govresponsibility because it entailed strengthening the

ernor without assuring an adequate check on that power.
On the other side, the government researchers argued that

government could be made both efficient and responsible.
They contended that the consolidation of executive func-

tions under the governor would not only increase the

likelihood of obtaining efficiency in government, but
would also provide the voters with

readily identifiable

a

official to hold accountable for the actions of government.

As the government researchers concluded, this

would be impossible to obtain under

fragmented govern-

a

mental system. ^°
The standards of state reorganization

.

Over the span of

ten years, the New York Bureau issued numerous studies

making specific recommendations for improving administrative organization and management in municipal governments.

In 1915,

at the request of the New York consti-

tutional convention, the Bureau undertook the first com-

prehensive study of state government.

Although its pro-

posals were rejected by the voters, its recommendations on

agency consolidation, the executive budget, and gubernatorial staffing patterns became the model as one state

after another reorganized its administrative structures.
By 1938,

Based on those experiences, Arthur

plans.

piled

twenty-three states had adopted reorganization

a

E.

Buck com-

list of the standards of state reorganization.

21

20

Ik

That list is still cited in most introductory state govern-

ment texts.
First on Buck's list was "the concentration of au-

thority and responsibility under the elected chief executive."

This necessitated giving the governor power to ap-

point and remove the heads of all administrative departments.

As Buck noted, many states permitted exceptions

to this standard.

tive positions

The argument was that some administra-

(like the attorney-general for instance)

were too sensitive to be brought under the governor's
control.

Buck warned that once exceptions were made for

some agencies it would become easier to ask for still

other exceptions.

Buck believed that this was the most

important of the reorganization standards.

Its dilution

could mean the failure of a reorganization plan.

22

The second standard called for "the consolidation
of all related administrative functions under one depart-

ment."

2^

In the view of Buck and the other early state

reorganizers, implementation of this standard was simply

technological problem.

a

They believed that it was a matter

of gathering data on all the functions performed by govern-

ment and then assigning similar functions to one department

.

^
What the early state reorganizers and Buck failed

to understand was that some programs simply do not divide

along neat departmental lines.

For instance, what about a

15

program designed to stimulate the sale of agricultural
goods to foreign nations?

Does it belong under the State

Department or under the Department of Agriculture?
is no easy answer to this question.

There

As one writer warned:

the term f unct ionalism is, seemingly, capable of
such broad interpretation, or misinterpretation,
that it can be used to justify the creation of a department which would encompass the entire government.
...in this sense the concept of f unct ionalism is
totally valueless as a basis of departmental inte-

gration 25
.

The third standard on Buck's list called for "the

elimination of the use of boards for purely administrative
work."

Boards and commissions had originated as

insulating administrative work from politics.

a

means of

In practice,

this arrangement had only promoted administrative irrespon-

sibility and the capture of the boards by the special interests.

With state problems growing more complex, there

was serious doubt whether a multi-member board was the most

efficient administrative arrangement.

For these reasons,

the state reorganizers advocated abolishing all boards ex-

cept those used for regulatory purposes.
The fourth standard of reorganization called for
"the provision of staff services to the governor."

27

The

state reorganizers believed that these services were essential if the governor was to be able to control the admin-

istrative agencies under his supervision.

These staff

services would include: special administrative and program
experts who could provide the governor with an independent

.

16

source of policy information, budget making authority over
all operating agencies, central purchasing, planning, and

central accounting.

Evaluating these staff services in

a

1950 publication, the Council of State Governments con-

cluded that the budget had become the most important tool
of the twentieth century governor because it offers "the

opportunity for the consideration of all programs and policies in one consistent frame where they might be compared, their relationships examined, and rational choices

made

1,28

Fifth on the list was the "provision for an inde-

pendent audit."

7

This audit was supposed to be the func-

tion of the state legislature.

It is interesting to note

that the audit proposal represents the only attempt by the

state reorganizers to improve the legislature's control

over the state bureaucracy.
The final standard called for "the recognition of
the governor's cabinet."^

0

Neither Buck nor any of the

other reorganizers ever fully explained this standard,
but it can be presumed that they had in mind the model of

the President's cabinet.

They envisioned a collegial

body participating with the governor in decision-making.

Unfortunately, this was not the manner in which the federal
cabinet operated.

The President has never shared his

decision-making authority with his cabinet.

With respect

governors
to the governor, one must conclude that few

having just improved their decision-making authority
would want to share it with a cabinet.
To summarize briefly, the beginnings of the state

reorganization movement can be traced to the late nineteenth century when government reformers were struggling

against the political machines.

The reformers'

initial

efforts were directed at making government more responsible to the people.

They concentrated their efforts on

removing corrupt politicians from office and replacing
them with "good" men.

Beyond that, they seemed to have

no clear idea of what they wanted these "good" men to
do once they were in office.
It was the

development of the government research

bureaus which gave the government reform movement its
concern with economy and efficiency.
by business methods,

Heavily influenced

the government research bureaus

focused their efforts on reorganizing governmental structures in order to make government more economic and more

efficient.

Eventually, they developed

a

set of standards

which included: 1-concentrat ion of authority and responsibility under the elected chief executive, 2-consolidation of all related administrative functions under one

department, 3-the elimination of the use of boards for

administrative work,

4

-the provision of staff services to

the governor, 5-the provision of an independent audit,

and 6-the recognition of the governor's cabinet.

These

18

standards are still used whenever a state undertakes admin-

istrative reorganization.

However, it should be noted

that the use of a standardized model has not made the state

reorganization movement anymore successful in achieving its
objectives.

Is this because the standards were inadequate

to begin with?

Or,

is there some other reason for the

failure of the movement?
Why State Reorganization Efforts
Have Not Been More Effective

It

is evident to anyone familiar with the last sixty

years of state government that administrative reorganizations have now become a common occurrence.

Illinois became the first state to adopt

a

Since 1917 when

comprehensive

administrative reorganization plan, every state has engaged in some reorganization activity.

Yet despite this

record of frequent adoptions, there is no evidence to

indicate that the reorganization movement has actually

achieved more efficient management or more responsible
state government.

On the contrary, the evidence suggests

that duplication and overlapping are still the most common

characteristics of state administration.

There is constant

worry that state bureaucracy has become uncontrollable.

31

While there are many reasons one could cite for the in-

effectiveness of the state reorganization movement, three
seem most prominent.

.

19

The failure of the state reorganizers to appreciate the
1.
politics involved in the reorganization process.

When the first state reorganization plans were

being drafted, the prevailing orthodoxy in public administration included two premises which the early state reorganizers wholeheartedly endorsed: 1-that organization
theory was a technological problem, i.e., the choices of

agency structure and location were matters to be decided
by objective criteria such as hierarchy,
etc.

span of control,

and 2-that politics and administration were two

separate processes, with the first the domain of the elected

political officials and the second the domain of the professionally trained and politically neutral career administrators

J

As a result,

the state reorganizers saw reorganiza-

tion as a technological problem solvable by the application of the proper scientific principles.

It was almost

unthinkable to the early state reorganizers that opposition to the reorganization plan could develop since it
was grounded in "scientific methods."!

Moreover once

a

plan was officially adopted by a state, the reorganizers ex-

pected the administrative specialists to implement it
without hesitation.

Thus the early state reorganizers

seldom planned for the implementation phase.

They saw no

need for the hiring of special consultants or other admin-

istrative personnel who would oversee the implementation.
Spurred by the belief that reorganization also produced

!
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economies in government, the early reorganizers no doubt
would have viewed these extra administrative expenses as

wasteful
What the early state reorganizers did not under-

stand was that organization theory is actually a choice of

political strategy because "a choice of organizational
structure is

a

choice of which interest or which value

will have preferred access or greater emphasis" in the

administrative system.

J

This is why agencies consider

administrative structure to be so important.

They believe

that it may influence decisions on budgets, functions,

programs, personnel, or even agency prestige.

Thus, bu-

reaucratic participants (e.g., the agency, its clientele,
the governor, and legislators) will fight to obtain the

kind of organization they believe to be most beneficial
to their interests.

Any proposal to change structures,

as would be encompassed in a reorganization plan, is

greeted by them with fear and suspicion.

If a reorganiza-

tion plan threatens their interests, it is likely that

bureaucratic participants will try to kill the plan.

Failing this, they will probably try to have the objectionable provisions removed from the plan.
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Even after a reorganization plan is officially

adopted, there is no guarantee that it will ever be implemented.

Administrators are not robots in the policy execu

tion phase.

On the contrary, they are influenced by

their professional training, prejudices, interests, etc.
It

seems likely then that those who have been adversely

affected by

a

reorganization will continue their struggle

throughout the implementation phase.

In fact,

case stud-

ies show that this is where most reorganizations

accurately, their objectives) are defeated. 35

(or more

Since the

early state reorganizers did not consider implementation
to be a problem,

they did not maintain any vigilance to

assure that their plans were fully implemented.
the affected agencies free to maneuver.

This left

The result was

very often the nullification of the organization chart on

which the state reorganizers had worked so diligently.
An example from the literature which illustrates

this can be found in Francis Rourke's study of the 19^9 re-

organization of the federal employment security program
The principal opponents

under the Department of Labor.

of the reorganization were the state employment offices

which feared that their autonomy would be destroyed under
the proposed reorganization.

Except for a brief period

under the War Manpower Commission during World War II,
the state agencies long enjoyed a great deal of discre-

tion and freedom of action under the federal employment
agency.

The state employment officials believed that the

proposed reorganization was just

a

guise for a plan to

nationalize the employment security program and give the
Secretary of Labor complete authority over state actions.
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Also opposing the reorganization were employers' groups

who feared that the reorganization would result in in-

creased taxes for them.

They also believed that the Sec-

retary of Labor could not be

involving wages and workers.

a

neutral observer in matters
Thus, employers' groups ex-

pected the reorganization to result in

a

biased adminis-

tration of the employment security program. 37
Despite the vigorous objections of these groups, the
19^9 reorganization passed.

This did not end the struggle

for control of the employment security program.

Shortly

after adoption, the Secretary of Labor threatened to withhold federal funds from two states which he claimed were
not complying with federal standards.

This was exactly

what the states had feared, and they used the opportunity
to mount a congressional attack on the secretary's authority.

Not only did they succeed in forcing the secretary

to withdraw his threat, but they also succeeded in getting

Congress to approve an amendment to the Social Security
Act.

That amendment would prevent any further attempt by
oo

3
the Secretary of Labor to nationalize the system.-

As this case illustrates, politics is involved

both in the adoption and implementation phases of a reor-

ganization plan.

In this particular case, the informal

relationship which existed between the states and the
federal agency proved to be the deciding factor in defeating the objectives of the 19^9 reorganization plan.

Be-

cause state reorganizers have so seldom taken all of these

"political" factors into account, they have not prepared
for the intense struggles which continue long after a plan
is officially adopted by a state.

For this reason, many

reorganization plans become just useless additions to
organization charts.
The overemphasis on the claim that adoption of struc2.
tural reorganization will result in significant monetary
savings for state government.
One of the things that stands out in the rhetoric
of the state reorganization movement is that structural

reorganization was supposed to achieve savings for state
government.

The theory was that the consolidation of

overlapping programs and functions and the elimination of
others whose existence could no longer be justified would

produce those economies. ^9

A.E. Buck cited several cases

of states saving millions of dollars just by enacting a

reorganization plan.

In his book, Buck urged all propon-

ents of reorganization to use the savings aspect as the

principal selling point for
However

a

a

reorganization.

i4

o

close examination of the record shows

that structural reorganization by itself has never a-

chieved the predicted savings.

Schmeckebier

,

Lewis Meriam and Laurence

in their study of federal reorganizations,

demonstrate that the kind of budget savings envisioned by
the early state reorganizers can only be achieved by the

wholesale elimination of government functions.

As the
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authors show, this process of eliminating functions must
begin with the largest departments since they are the

major consumers of

a

government's budget.

However these

also happen to be the long established departments with

powerful interest group and legislative backing.

For

this reason, Meriam and Schmeckebier conclude that it is

unlikely that economy measures will begin in these departments.

Therefore, the likelihood of achieving large mone-

tary savings through reorganization is remote.
On the other hand, there is some indication that

improving budget, purchasing and accounting procedures,

introducing central planning, and professionalizing the
career civil service may produce
ment.

a

more efficient govern-

The executive's ability to decide among competing

policies and programs may be enhanced, and the ultimate
result may be the provision of better services to those
h o

who need them.

Ironically, the implementation of these

efficiency measures may actually lead to budget increases.
It has been shown that prof essionalizat ion of the public

service creates built-in pressures to increase government
spending.

This arises because professionals want to im-

prove the quality of government services by adopting the

innovative new programs recommended by their disciplines.
In the long run,

this is going to increase governmental

expenditures.
It must be concluded then that overemphasizing the
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savings aspect of structural reorganization has fostered
hopes which cannot be realized.

As a result, reorganiza-

tion plans are abandoned quickly when the expected savings do not materialize.

Given the great number of re-

organizations that have occurred since 1917, it appears
that states are caught up in a perpetual cycle of adopting

reorganization plans.

Some of these abandoned reorganiza-

tion plans are eventually recycled when another period of

reorganization activity occurs.

Data on past reorganiza-

tions show that none of this activity has yet produced the

significant savings that were predicted by Buck and the
other early state reorganizers

.

In the final analysis,

it would appear that this overemphasis on concrete econo-

mies has detracted from the effort to make government more

efficiently managed.
The continued inability of the governor to control the
state bureaucracy.
3.

Despite all of the recent efforts to strengthen the
office of the governor, the weakness of the office remains
a

major obstacle to achieving an efficient and responsible

administrative system.

Part of the problem lies in the

increasing specialization of the state bureaucracy over
the last thirty years.

Given the complexity of state

problems, the governor simply cannot compete with the policy expertise of the bureaucracy.
a

The latter has developed

finely tuned sense of the "rules of the game."

It

knows,
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for instance, that despite the governor's statements that
he will not allow a budget increase for the present fiscal

year, there are built-in pressures which will force such

increases over the governor's objections.

1

^

The governor is always cast in the role of the

newcomer to the system.

He comes into office with little

knowledge of complex policy matters (although he may have
a pet

policy which he promotes) and often with no previous

administrative experience.

His personal policy staff is

as novice as the governor it is trying to serve.

More-

over, just as the governor and his staff are beginning to

acquire some expertise in administrative matters, the

governor's term ends.

The cycle then begins anew as a

new governor takes office.

heJ

After studying the Illinois budget process, Thomas

Anton was led to conclude that state government could probably run itself without even having a governor in office.

Anton suspects that the governor is aware of his tenuous

position and that this prompts him to try to prove to the
system that it really needs him.

One way the governor can

accomplish this is by championing change:

a

reorganization

plan or perhaps the adoption of a new program.

But there

are limitations on the governor's time and policy expertise.

The governor soon finds that he must confine his

change efforts to one agency or one functional area at
time.

a

The result is that while the governor is preoccu-
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pied with that one area others go virtually unreviewed, some
even for years.

Anton concludes that in the end the gover-

nor's change efforts are probably more symbolic than sub-

stantive.^ 6

Another factor in the governor's continuing inability to control the state bureaucracy can be traced to
the growth of the federal grant-in-aid system.

By its

nature, the grant system is restrictive since each grant

program arises from a federal decision to promote certain
policy aims on

a

national scale.

government cannot force

217
1

Because the federal

state to participate in the pro-

a

gram, it must buy the state's cooperation by agreeing to
h

Q

bear the largest share of the program's cost.

By

1975, there were 975 separate federal assistance programs

with

a

total value estimated at $51.7 billion.

hqy

Obvious-

ly this sum represents an important revenue source which

enables states to expand and improve their services.

However it must also be acknowledged that this grant
system has taken much of the policy initiative and control
from the governor and given it to a "f ederal/stat e admin-

istrative network."
This network had its origins in the federal require-

ment that state officials operating grant programs be

covered by

a

merit system.

It has been furthered by

federal efforts to introduce educational requirements
for professional

staff.

In the process,

state adminis-

28

trators operating federal grant programs have become important allies of the federal government.

They tend to

have policy objectives which are similar to those of their
federal counterparts.

Since they are in constant communi-

cation with federal officials, state administrators become
the "official" interpreters of federal policy intentions.

Elected state officials who for the most part have been
left out of those discussions must either accept the ad-

ministrators' interpretations or risk losing federal
grant money for noncompliance.-^

State administrators also play a role in main-

taining state compliance to all federal program regulations.

The ultimate weapon which the federal government

has in inducing state compliance is the withholding of

federal funds.

In practice this is seldom used since

federal policy aims can only be realized if

functioning.

a

program is

Nevertheless the threat to withhold federal

funds remains an important weapon in federal/state nego-

tiations concerning the level of state compliance.

A

state must however be convinced that this threat may be

carried out in its case, and state administrators cooperate with federal officials by convincing state elected

officials that the federal threat is genuine.
In her study of the federal grant system, Martha

Derthick describes how the Massachusetts Public Welfare

Commissioner convinced state legislators that the federal

government would withhold grant funds unless the state

adopted an educational requirement for public welfare case
workers.

Derthick feels that this cooperation of state

officials is pivotal in negotiating state compliance.
Without it, federal policy aims cannot be assured. 51

Within the last ten years, there has been an
effort to give the governor and state legislators more

participation in the management of the grant system.

A

report of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental

Relations (1977) details the changes which have taken
place since 1968 when the Intergovernmental Cooperation
Act was passed during the administration of Lyndon

Johnson.

The basic purpose of the

1

968 legislation

was to facilitate coordination among the various federal

grant programs and the levels of government which admin-

istered them.

The Advisory Commission's report states

that the Nixon administration made the 1968 legislation
the basis for its "new federalism."

According to the re-

port, Nixon felt that the solution to most of the problems

confronting twentieth century government lay in "improved

administration and refined technique." 53

Thus unlike the

Kennedy and Johnson administrations, the Nixon administration was predisposed to solving managerial issues.
This inclination was reflected in Nixon's efforts
to consolidate federal grant programs, to reorganize the

federal government, and to create state clearinghouses
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through which state officials could review and comment on

federal-aid programs.

5^

The capstone of the Nixon efforts

came with the passage of the State/Local Fiscal Assistance
Act of 1972

(revenue sharing).

^

That legislation pro-

vided for the giving of undedicated federal money directly
to state and local governments for purposes which they

would determine.

State officials had long argued that

the grant system thwarted state creativity by placing too

many program restrictions on state administrators.

The

Nixon administration was attempting to answer this criticism by returning major decision-making responsibility
to the states.

Although it is clear that these efforts

have established the machinery through which the governor
and state legislators can recapture some of the policy

initiative they lost to the bureaucracy, it is still too
early to know how well individual governors are using this

machinery.

Moreover there also remains considerable

question whether revenue sharing has actually resulted
in the creation of innovative state policy.
In summary,

three reasons seem to account for the

ineffectiveness of the state reorganization movement.
First, state reorganizers have not taken into account the

politics involved in determining organizational structure.
Political actors are concerned with the question of structure since it may determine which interest will have

greater access to the governor and other decision-making

centers in state government.

Therefore, they are willing

to fight to determine the type of structure which they

believe will most favor their interests.
openly opposing

a

If this means

reorganization plan or subverting

a

reorganization once it is officially adopted, then they
are prepared to do so.

Second, state reorganizers

overemphasized their claims for economies which might
result from reorganization.

Studies show that great

economies are not possible unless politicians are willing
to abolish government programs.

Since they are not will-

ing to take this step, it is obvious that reorganization

plans are not going to result in any tremendous savings
for government.

Third, the power of the governor has

not kept pace with the rapid growth of the state bureauThe federal grant-in-aid system has increased

cracy.

the influence of state administrators since they know

how to deal with their federal counterparts.

Although

there have been several changes in the federal grant

system which may improve the governor's chances of in-

fluencing state policy, it is still too soon to evaluate
the effect of these changes.

State Reorganization in the Seventies

Factors contributing to the renewed interest in reorganization

.

In spite of the well-publicized past failures of

the state reorganization movement, it now appears that

a
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new wave of reorganization activity has begun.

Since

1965, nineteen states have undergone comprehensive re-

organization and many others have undertaken reorganization studies.

J

As in the past,

the motivations for the

interest in reorganization appear to be similar for most
of these states.

The first and also the most common motivation stems

from the desire to make state administration more effective. 57

Over the last decade, there has been growing

concern that government is incapable of responding innovatively to major domestic problems.

Governmental struc-

tures are seen as being mired in red tape.

Critics

charge that government reacts to a crisis after it happens rather than anticipates it before it occurs.

Thus

instead of arriving at innovative solutions to the problem, government seems to attempt a patchwork solution

designed to cope with the immediate crisis.
It was in response to those concerns that the

federal government began efforts to improve the grant system and to institute reorganization among its own departments.
a

On the state level, the response has prompted

renewed interest in reorganization as

vitalizing state administration.

a

means of re-

Supporters believe that

reorganization can create the kind of administrative environment in which significant policy changes may occur.
The second factor contributing to the recent

interest in reorganization stems from the fiscal crisis
in

which many of the states now find themselves.

States are

faced with a dwindling base of revenues coupled with an

almost insatiable demand for still more government services. 58

Since most people believe that state taxes are

already too high, it does not seem likely that there
will be any public support for even higher taxes.

This

has placed state officials in the unenviable position of

trying to accommodate these demands with the available
resources.

Since the two are not equal, something has to

give; or does it?

Many decision makers are claiming that reorganization is the solution to their fiscal problems.

They say

that the reorganization process will provide them with the

opportunity to reevaluate entrenched programs which normally are exempt from review in an incremental decision
process.

In rhetoric that sounds ominously similar to

A.E. Buck, governors and other state leaders are confi-

dently predicting that significant savings can be achieved
if reorganization plans are adopted.

With these savings,

they expect to be able to meet the public's demand for

additional government services.

Unfortunately given the

past promises of state reorganizers and their failure to

achieve great economies (or any at all), one has to question the advisability of trying to sell the public a similar spiel.

One also has to wonder whether today's public
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will be so gullible as to accept these extravagant and un-

proved claims.
A

third factor in the recent reorganization activ-

ity stems from the states'

experience with Planning, Pro-

gramming and Budgeting systems (PPB) during the 1960s.
After the meager accomplishments of the two national

Hoover Commissions and the "little Hoover commissions"
on the state level, many people grew disenchanted with

the state reorganization movement.

They had seen the

great promises of the Hoover Commissions dissolve in the

bitter political conflicts over reorganization, and they
were reluctant to go through that again.

Evidence of

this can be seen in the fact that there was not much re-

organization activity from the mid-1950s until the present
wave of reorganization began in 1965-

59

In a sense, PPB bypassed the reorganization pro-

cess by trying to rationalize the decision process through
a

budget system.

60

PPB's proponents claimed that it

could identify major governmental programs, define pro-

gram goals, establish priority among those goals, and offer

alternative approaches to reach those goals.

They claimed

that once the decision was made to pursue a certain

program PPB would then serve as the means by which the
elected officials could evaluate the program's effectiveness. 61
The attempts to implement PPB failed, but in the
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process students of administration rediscovered the value
of reorganization.

One of the problems which PPB had

faced was that it created program structures which did
not correspond to actual organizational structures.

Thus

program structures had little relevance to the decision
makers or administrators.

To adapt PPB program structures

to what PPB's proponents saw as chaotic organizational

structures would have defeated the purpose of PPB.
Therefore, the solution seemed to point toward the creation
of organizational structures which corresponded to the

major program areas of government.
In 1969,

the state of Massachusetts tried unsuccess-

fully to implement both a reorganization plan and a PPB
type decision structure called "Program Management System."

The architects of the Massachusetts plan believed

that their Program Management System would be an important
tool in the hands of the newly appointed cabinet secre-

According to one official, the budget system

taries.

would give the secretaries an extra edge by providing

them with "a clear capability to describe who was doing
what, to whom, at what cost, and with what presumed re-

sults." 63
A

fourth factor stems from the effect of the

citizen participation movement of the 1960s.

The desire

to make government more responsible to the people was a

major factor in the early state reorganizations.

The
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recent citizen participation movement echoes this desire,

calling for government to be more responsive to people's
needs.

The movement seems especially concerned with

government's responsiveness to the needs of poorer
citizens in urban areas.

These are the people who have

been underrepresented both in the elected government

offices and in the bureaucracies which administer government programs.
The citizen participation movement gave rise to a

host of demands for community control over neighborhood

schools, community development programs, health services,
and other programs which deliver social and human services.
In some cases,

the movement even produced demands that the

regular civil service be bypassed in order to place more

minorities in the bureaucracies.

It was reasoned that

this would make government bureaucracy more sympathetic
to the problems facing minority group members and thus

better able to administer the government programs which
affect them.

64

The impact of the citizen participation movement has

been especially felt at the local level where community

action programs have succeeded in creating

a

new sub-

structure of government at the neighborhood level.

Many

of these substructures are concerned with the problems of

how to deliver social services to those who need them the
most.

The solution has been to create neighborhood in-
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formation or referral centers where residents could be

directed to the services they require.

In some cases,

there have also been attempts to create one-stop neighborhood service centers where existing social service agencies
can provide their services under one roof.^5

The impact of the citizen participation movement
has been less visible on the state level.

Nevertheless

the climate created by the movement coupled with the

recent court decisions on legislative reapportionment
have had an impact on state government.

Recent state re-

organizations have emphasized the need to make state
government more visible and more accessible to the average citizen.

Some of the recent state reorganizations in

the areas of health and human resources have reflected

this by creating regional districts for the delivery of

services.

This accomplishes the aims of integration

and it also makes state government more visible in the

community.

Given the traditional mistrust of state gov-

ernment, this high visibility cannot help but be

a

positive

result for state government.
The fifth factor reflects what can best be de-

Jack Walker's analy-

scribed as "the bandwagon effect."

sis of state innovations shows that adoption of a new pro-

gram by a pioneering state, either

a

regional or a national

leader, may trigger the adoption of the same program by

other states. 67

It

is not uncommon for states to copy
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innovative legislation almost verbatim, grammatical and

spelling errors included.

Walker speculates that this

copying is the result of the natural reluctance of state
officials to assume the risks of deviating from old
routines.

On the other hand, Walker makes it clear

that those risks decrease considerably once states

adopt a new program.

In fact, Walker notes that when a

large number of states have adopted the program in

question, it becomes recognized as a legitimate respon-

sibility for all states.

That provokes a rush to jump

on the bandwagon before one's state gets the reputation
r o

for being backward.

Looking at state reorganization activity over the
last sixty years, it seems apparent that the same pattern

which Walker describes is also present in the reorganization field.

The fact is that reorganizations by pioneer-

ing states usually spark intense reorganization activity

among the remainder.

Reorganization at the federal level

may also be a spark for state reorganizations.

The 1911

Taft Commission, the two Hoover Commissions, and the 1968

Ash Committee were also followed by state reorganization

activity.

Judging by the increasing number of states

which have either just adopted reorganization legislation
or which are in the process of considering reports of

reorganization study committees, it seems safe to conclude that this bandwagon effect is once again in opera-

.

39
t

ion
To summarize, there are five factors which appear

to be stimulating the recent interest in state reorganiza-

tion:
(1) the desire to make state administration more efficient
(2) the belief that reorganization will result in
financial savings that can be used to pay for additional government services,
(3) the experience with PPB and other budgeting systems which pointed up the need to create organizational structures that corresponded to major program
areas of government,
(^)the citizen participation movement which stimulated
interest in creating governmental structures which are
more responsive to people's needs, and
(5)the reorganization attempts by the federal government and several innovative states which have created
a "bandwagon effect" in that other states now feel
compelled to adopt reorganization plans because everyone is doing it.
,

Of these five factors, the most important would appear to
be the desire for more efficient governmental adminis-

tration, the quest for additional savings in governmental
Interestingly,

operations, and the "bandwagon effect."

these are the same factors which stimulated most of the

interest in state reorganization more than sixty years ago.
Trends in state reorganization activity

.

Recent activity

in the reorganization field shows considerable diversity in

approach.

Within the last ten years, nineteen states have

undergone comprehensive reorganization; however

a

major-

ity seem to have adopted the more limited approach of

consolidating one major functional area at

a time.

One

of the areas receiving greatest attention is the human
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resources field.

A

197^ study by the Council of State

Governments reports that twenty-six states have created com

prehensive human resources agencies (CHRAs) which combine
public assistance social-services with at least three

other human resources programs: public health, mental
health, mental retardation, employment services, vocational

rehabilitation, youth institutions, and adult corrections. 69

Another twelve states have what the Council of

State Governments describes as multi-functional human re-

sources agencies.

These are agencies which combine pub-

lic assistance-social services with at least one other
.

major human resources program.
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Perhaps more important though, the Council of
State Governments study also identifies three states
(Arizona, Georgia, and Washington) which have integrated
CHRAs.

The primary difference between a consolidated

CHRA and an integrated CHRA is that the former does not

attempt to dismantle the traditional program lines (i.e.,
each major program area retains responsibility both for

program development and program delivery) whereas the
latter separates program development and program delivery
into two different organizational units.

The program

development unit would be responsible for developing all
of the human services programs within the CHRA's juris-

diction.

It would also monitor operations and evaluate

performance.

The program delivery unit would be respon-

Ill

sible for seeing that all human services functions are

delivered through an agencywide regional delivery system. 71

The idea of breaking down traditional program

lines grew out of the realization that the social services system was too fragmented both in its organizational

structures and in its approach to the solution of the welfare problem.

The feeling was that the typical family on

welfare had several interrelated problems: housing, unemployment, educational, medical, etc.

It was

felt that

these could only be solved by a "wholistic" approach.
It was not just a question of the services not existing,

but rather that the services were delivered by separate

agencies.

These agencies (both governmental and private)

approached the welfare problem from the perspective of

particular professional specialty.

a

Service providers

were often not even aware of the full range of social

services offered in the community.

Thus they were unable

to refer a family to the other services it required.

When

such referrals were made, there was no attempt by the re-

ferring agency to see what effect these additional services had on the family.
tern

The net effect was that the sys-
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seemed to foster dependency.

Beginning in the late 1960s, the federal government
sponsored efforts to integrate the social services at the

neighborhood or community level.

The earliest efforts

k2

came in the Community Action and Neighborhood Services

Programs of the Office of Economic Opportunity.

The

Department of Health, Education and Welfare's (HEW) involvement began in 1970 when it created
on services integration

.

? 3

a

task force

Qne of the first things to

come out of that effort was a working definition of

social services integration:
The linking together by various means of the services of two or more service providers to allow
treatment of an individual's or family's needs h
in a more coordinated and comprehensive nature.'
The HEW task force also recommended that the

department sponsor Service Integration Targets of Opportunity (abbreviated SITO).

The latter are service

agencies which have the capacity to deliver
of social services.

a large

number

The existence of a SITO in a local

community makes it easier for the social service client
since he now has to go to only one agency, rather than
several, in order to receive the services he and his family
require.

Between 1971 and

197*1,

HEW spent $15 million for

forty-four SITOs located at the regional, county, local,
75
and neighborhood levels.

HEW has also demonstrated its support for services

integration at the state level through its sponsorship
7

of the Allied Services Act

(1972).

ft

Although that legis-

lation has not yet passed in Congress, it indicates HEW's

willingness to supply grant money for state planning in
the services integration area.

Another provision of the

bill would have permitted states to transfer up to 30% of
one program's funds to another program if that was con-

sistent with its services integration plan. 77
As might be expected, the traditional profes-

sions have not been very receptive to the concept of services integration because it means they lose control over
the programs they have developed.

Program specialists

argue that it is neither feasible nor conducive to political accountability to divorce program development from

services delivery.

They especially resent the intrusion

of generalist control (under services integration, the

generalists would deliver the actual services), and they
claim that the generalists cannot possibly understand all
of the purposes involved in the creation of a particular

Thus, it is likely that the new CHRA head will

program.

find it difficult to maintain agency morale and to secure
the cooperation of the program specialists.

In the long

run, the ability of the CHRA head to achieve these will

probably determine the success or failure of the services

integration concept at the state level.
A
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second development which has especially been

welcomed by the governor is the power to reorganize by
executive order. 79

Up to now, that power has been granted

only to the President of the United States.

governor wanted to reorganize

a

If a state

particular agency, he had

to seek the passage of a statute or the adoption of

a

con-

4iJ

stitutional amendment.
at

This has recently changed since

least thirteen states have passed legislation permitting

the governor to issue executive orders reorganizing the

state administrative structures.^ 0

As in the case of

the federal legislation, the new state legislation

gives the state legislatures the power to veto the

governor's action within

a

prescribed period of time.

Supporters of this new state legislation believe
that it will give the governor the capability of reacting

much more quickly to the management needs of

ministrative system.

a

large ad-

However they should be cautioned

that this new authority represents no magic panacea for
a

governor's problems with the state bureaucracy.

Just

as Presidents have found it difficult to use an executive

order to carry out reorganization, it is likely that

governors will encounter similar problems.
when President John

F.

For example:

Kennedy tried to create a Depart-

ment of Urban Affairs by executive order, it was rejected
O

by a congressional committee veto.

-l

Because of that

rejection, his successor, President Lyndon Johnson,

decided to submit his plans for the creation of the Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Department of Transportation as legislation for congressional

consideration.

Like President Johnson, most governors

may find it prudent in some cases to submit their reor-

ganization plans in the form of legislation.
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The third development, sunset legislation, appeared
in 1976.

Technically, sunset legislation is not the same

thing as reorganization.

However, its supporters claim

that sunset legislation may actually accomplish what
past reorganizations have failed to do: elimination of
the overlapping and duplication among state agencies

and the termination of those agencies whose services are
no longer required.

What makes sunset legislation u-

nique is that it sets an automatic termination date for
every agency.

If the state legislature takes no posi-

tive action to restart the agency (by passing a new enO o

abling act), then the agency ceases to exist.
In order to restart an agency, a legislature is

required to undertake what amounts to

a

zero-based re-

view of the agency's programs and services.

The burden of

proof in this process rests on the agency and its supporters.

They must demonstrate to the legislature that

there is continued need for the agency.

As a result of

the review, the legislature may decide to reenact new

enabling legislation, to terminate the agency, or to
merge it with other agencies performing similar functions.

In order to lessen the burden on the legisla-

ture, most states with sunset legislation provide that
the zero-based review process will occur on a staggered

basis.

During the review phase, all agencies with simi-

84
lar functions are examined together.
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Supporters of the sunset concept point out that
this gives the state legislature a very important role
in overseeing the bureaucracy.

As already noted in

this chapter, the state reorganization movement virtu-

ally ignored the legislature in the oversight process.

Obviously, the sunset concept could become an important
tool for the state legislature, but its success will

probably depend upon the particular legislature conducting
the review process as well as the staff which the legis-

lature has at its disposal.

Colorado was the first state to enact sunset

legislation (1976).
followed that course.

Since then, ten other states have
What is disturbing is that six

of those other states have adopted much more comprehen-

sive legislation than Colorado.

The latter state viewed

its sunset legislation as only experimental.

For that

reason, the sunset concept was limited to licensing and

regulatory agencies.

The sunset legislation enacted in

Arkansas, Alabama, Indiana, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and

South Dakota extends to every administrative agency in
state government ^5
.

Since the legislatures of these

six states do not have the reputation for being very

strong, it should be interesting to see whether the sunset concept fares well in these states.
It may be that the sunset

state government has long needed.

concept is just what
On the other hand, it

may also be that the sunset concept is just another lofty

proposal of the government reform movement.

The key

seems to be the willingness and the ability of the

legislature to take advantage of the new tool.

Based on

the experience of the states already possessing sunset

legislation, there is little evidence to suggest that
this is happening.

Conclusions
This chapter has shown that the state reorganiza-

tion movement had its beginnings in the efforts of the

nineteenth century reformers to make government more responsible to the people.

Those early efforts concentrated

on electing "good men" to governmental offices.

The

reformers also introduced measures which were designed
to assure that the average citizen could control his

government.

As the record shows, the reformers managed

to elect some of their candidates, but their reform

measures were largely ineffective.
With the creation of the municipal research

bureaus in the early 1900s, the concern of the movement
shifted toward making government more efficient and more
economical.

Unfortunately the state reorganizers never

succeeded in making state government either more responsible or more efficient.

They had not counted on the

politics that is involved in reorganizing governmental
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structures.

They assumed that once a reorganization plan

was adopted by a state it would be fully implemented.
In retrospect,

it

also appears that the early state re-

organizers over sold the savings claim of reorganization.
The only way those kinds of savings could have been

realized was through wholesale cuts in government services, but the state reorganizers never fully explained

that to the public.

Finally, the power of the governor

never seemed to keep pace with the rapidly expanding state
bureaucracy.

It will take more than a reorganization

plan to give the governor complete control over the
state bureaucracy.
Over the last ten years, there has been renewed

interest in reorganization.

As this chapter has indi-

cated, the motivations for this renewed interest are very

similar to those for past reorganizations.

States still

want more efficient and more responsible governments.

Many states seem to be grasping at reorganization in
the hope that it will result in huge savings which can then
be used to finance necessary services.

Based on past

record, the reader should be extremely skeptical of these

savings claims.

While it is still too soon to know whether the
latest round of reorganizations will be any more successful than the past ones,

ments hold some promise.

it does appear that recent develop-

The sunset concept is especially

significant because it brings the state legislature into
the oversight process.

Previous reorganization efforts

all but ignored the role of the state legislature.

sunset concept gives

a

The

central role to the legislature

as it evaluates whether agencies should be terminated

or "re-started."

Another development that rates some

interest is the extension of reorganization authority
to the governor.

Several states now permit the governor

to issue executive orders

(subject to legislative veto)

reorganizing state agencies.
The fact that states are now actively involving

both the legislature and the governor in the reorganiza-

tion process seems to reflect the growing realization
that reorganization is a political decision and not just
a

technical matter.

Moreover, the sunset concept empha-

sizes the continuing need for periodic review of organiza-

tional structures and purposes.

Early state reorganizers

looked on reorganization as basically a "one shot affair."
The sunset concept suggests that organization needs a

periodic and regular review so that duplication can be

eliminated and archaic agencies can be terminated.
Based on this reexamination of the state reorganization movement, one must conclude that state reorganization

efforts have for the most part been very unsuccessful.
Even though there appears to be enthusiasm for the latest

round of reorganization, one suspects that the results

.
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will also be disappointing.

In spite of the past failures

of the reorganization movement, Louisiana has joined the

reorganization bandwagon.

Chapter II will discuss the

reasons for this action and will look at some of the
results

,
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CHAPTER

II

BACKGROUND TO THE 1973 LOUISIANA REORGANIZATION
Introduc t ion
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the

background to the 1973 Louisiana reorganization.

A sur-

vey of recent Louisiana history reveals that the state

reorganization movement has not had much success in getting

reorganization plans adopted by Louisiana.

Except for an

abortive attempt in 19^0, Louisiana has remained largely
outside the general state reorganization movement.
has Louisiana been the exception?

Why

One reason for this may

lie in the fact that Louisiana governors have not sup-

ported reorganization efforts to the same extent as have

governors in other states.

As Chapter

demonstrates,

I

the support of the governor is often the key factor in

getting

a

reorganization plan adopted.

Governors have

seen reorganization as a way of increasing their con-

trol over the state bureaucracy and thereby gaining more

influence over the policy-making process.

Louisiana governor was already
state politics.

a

However, the

powerful figure in

Therefore, he had less to gain, and per-

haps even more to lose, from a reorganization.
It

is interesting to note that the 1973 reorgan58

.
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ization was not only supported by the governor, but it
was also initiated by him.

Why the change?

Perhaps one

reason is that Louisiana politics itself (especially the

character of the bifactional system) has changed greatly
since

It

19*40.

is now much more likely that the governor

will see reorganization as being advantageous to his interests

.

Chapter II also examines the debate over Governor
Edwards' reorganization plan, and it suggests how and why
the governor managed to get his plan approved by the state

legislature.

The chapter concludes with a look at the

agencies included in the consolidation and

a

brief examin-

ation of the powers and functions of the new health-welfare

department
Failure of Earlier Reorganization Efforts
For the first twenty years after the historic 1917

Illinois reorganization, Louisiana all but ignored the
movement.

In 1921,

the state convened a constitutional

convention, thus presenting an opportunity for reorganization proponents to initiate administrative reorganization.
The constitution which came out of that convention vio-

lated most of the tenets of the administrative reorganiza-

tion movement.

For example, the 1921 constitution con-

tinued the practice of electing the important administrative officers and also continued the use of boards and
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commissions for administrative work.
It was not

1

until 19^0 that the first comprehen-

sive reorganization was attempted.

This reorganization

came as a direct result of the "Louisiana hayride scan-

dals" of 1939.

Those scandals forced Governor Richard

Leche, the political heir of Huey Long, to resign from

office.

Eventually, Governor Leche and several of his

supporters were convicted of federal income tax evasion
and of using the United States mail to defraud.

Those scandals set the stage for

during the 1940 gubernatorial election.
candidate was Earl
nor Huey Long.
The latter'

s

K.

a

reform campaign

The Long machine

Long, the brother of the late Gover-

The reform candidate was Sam

H.

Jones.

previous political experience was as

a

dele-

gate to the 1921 constitutional convention and as an

assistant district attorney.

As part of his campaign,

Jones promised fiscal and administrative reform, a re-

duction in the immense powers accumulated by the governor's
office during the Long era, and reform of the state's

election laws.

It is interesting to note that while

Jones spoke out against the excesses of the Long machine,
he was careful to affirm his support for the liberal

social-welfare policies of the Longs.

Jones even prom-

ised to increase educational and welfare expenditures

(including a $30 monthly pension for the state's aged)
and to abolish the state sales tax.

61

Jones won the runoff primary over Earl Long, but
his margin of victory was a narrow one: 51.8% to 48.2$.

With this limited reform mandate, Governor Jones set about
the task of fulfilling his campaign promises.
the agenda was his reorganization pledge.

First on

To accomplish

this, Governor Jones hired the Chicago research firm,

Griffenhagen and Associates, to prepare
state agencies which could be abolished.

a

list of the
The firm was

also charged with the responsibility of making specific

recommendations for achieving greater economies in government operations.
The plan which resulted closely followed the ortho-

dox reorganization standards.

It

proposed consolidating

the state's 122 administrative agencies under twenty de-

partments, and it provided that department heads would be
subject to gubernatorial appointment and removal.

The

Griffenhagen plan also proposed that the governor be
Finally,

given authority to prepare the state budget.
it

laid out a plan for bringing state employees under

civil service system.

a

5

Governor Jones submitted his reorganization plan
to the legislature in the form of three legislative bills
(a

fiscal code, an administrative code, and

a

civil serv-

ice code) and two proposed constitutional amendments
(one giving constitutional force to the fiscal and admin-

istrative codes and the second embedding the civil serv-
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ice in the constitution).

opposed the plan.

The Longites in the legislature

They argued that the Griffenhagen pro-

posals would expand the governor's powers beyond anything
Huey Long had proposed while he was in office.

They also

opposed the civil service plan because they recognized
that its passage would eliminate most of the patronage

jobs upon which the political machine depended.

Facing so much legislative opposition, Governor
Jones was forced to accept major modifications in his
plan.

He agreed that thirteen of the proposed new depart-

ments should be given appointed boards and that all of
the departments with popularly elected heads should be

allowed to retain this method of selection.

Governor

Jones also agreed to drop the idea of imbedding the civil
service system in the constitution.

He opted instead

for a constitutional amendment which specified that any

change in city or state civil service laws would have
to be approved by two-thirds of both legislative houses.

7

The legislature eventually approved the watered

down version of the reorganization plan.

From there,

Governor Jones turned to the voters for their approval
of the two constitutional amendments.

These were narrowly

approved in November, 19^0; however Governor Jones' reform
victory was shortlived.

Within six months, the Louisiana

Supreme Court (still a stronghold of the Long machine)
held that the constitutional amendment giving force to

the fiscal and administrative codes was invalid.

The

legislature had failed to specify the exact date on
which the amendment was to be submitted to the voters for
their approval.

In 19^2, the Court invalidated the

fiscal and administrative codes on the grounds that these

legislative acts could not be separated from the already
invalidated amendment.

All that remained of the Jones

reforms was the civil service law.

This last vestige

of reform fell in 19^8 when the state legislature, once
o

again dominated by the Long faction, repealed the law.
After the failure of the 19^0 reorganization, it
was impossible to get any other comprehensive reorganiza-

tion legislation passed by the legislature.

The legis-

lature did however continue to undertake sporadic reor-

ganizations of individual departments.

Certainly one

of the reasons for this poor record must be traced to
the aftermath of the 19^0 reorganization struggle.

9

To

the Longs, reorganization became a code word for the ef-

forts of the anti-Longs to destroy the machine and its
To the anti-Longs, re-

liberal social-welfare policies.

organization became

a

symbol for the turning away from

political favoritism and patronage, abuse of the governor's powers, and a politicized bureaucracy that does the

bidding of the faction in power.

It

appeared that com-

prehensive reorganization would continue to be blocked as
long as reorganization remained

a

focal issue between the

.
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two factions.

Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, the bifactional
system remained a factor in Louisiana politics, and no

comprehensive reorganization was passed.

With the decline

of the bifactional system in the 1960s, one might have

thought that the chances of passing comprehensive reor-

ganization would improve, but this did not happen. 10
This is even more surprising in view of the fact that

Louisiana had

a two

term governor from 1964-1972

11

The experience from other states suggests that the

governor's role is pivotal in

a

reorganization struggle.

1

2

The reason for this lies in the fact that it is the gover-

nor who stands to gain the most if a reorganization is

adopted.

Therefore, it is he who initiates the discussion

about reorganization, often making it a campaign issue.

After the election, the governor uses the successful

adoption of a comprehensive reorganization plan as the
major accomplishment of his administration.

Surely then,

it would seem that if reorganization were to be success-

ful in Louisiana it would have come during the period

from 1964-1972.

Afterall, a governor who was persuasive

enough to get the state's voters to change the constitutional limit of one term for a governor should also be
able to secure the passage of a reorganization plan.
But the fact is that in Louisiana the governor

does not have that much to gain through the adoption of

a

reorganization plan.

Historically the Louisiana gover-

nor has always been the dominant actor in the state's

policy-making process. 13
mense.

His legislative powers are im-

He appoints committee chairman as well as the

entire membership of the Legislative Budget Committee.
The latter is an anomalous legislative committee which

works with the governor's budget director in the prep-

aration of the state's budget.

1^

The governor can even influence a legislator's

salary through his power to appoint the members of the

interim committees that conduct legislative business
between annual sessions.

Since these committees pay

their members on a per diem basis, the legislator who
serves on several of these committees can increase his

salary substantially.

The most significant statistic,

however, which illustrates the governor's dominance over
the legislature is that not a single gubernatorial veto

was overridden under the 1921 constitution.

15

The governor's position vis-a-vis the administra-

tive system has also been strong.

For instance, although

over Q0% of the state budget is derived from dedicated

revenues, 16 this has not diminished the governor's budget

authority since he appoints many of the executives in the

departments utilizing dedicated funds.

In 1964, the

governor appointed approximately 1,100 top-level executives
and influenced the selection of many lower-level state

.
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executives

1

R

To summarize,

the Louisiana governor is a power-

ful figure in state politics.

Even without the benefit

of reorganization, he appoints many of the top level

executives in state government.

He also has consider-

able influence over the state legislature.

He appoints

committee chairman and the entire membership of the

interim legislative committees.

No gubernatorial veto

has been overridden since the 1921 constitution went

into effect.

Based on these observations, it must be

concluded that the Louisiana governor really does not
have that much to gain by supporting reorganization.

He

would acquire the power to appoint many of the positions

which are presently elective, but he would also lose
many of his executive appointments to civil service.

Moreover since administrative reform is frequently

accompanied by efforts to institute legislative reform,
the net effect might be to increase the role of the

Given

legislative body at the expense of the governor.
these possibilities, it is suggested here that the

Louisiana governor might decide he is better off with an
unreformed administrative system.

No matter how chaotic

this system appears to outside observers, it is

a

sys-

tem which the governor can control.
If these observations are correct, the next ques-

tion should be: what made Edwin Edwards decide to conduct

a

reform campaign for governor in 1971-72?

The answer

seems to be that revelations of corruption during the

McKeithen administration made conditions ripe for such
campaign.

a

Also, Edwards needed an issue which would

make him stand out in a crowded field of seventeen

candidates running in the first Democratic primary.
The Emergence of Reorganization as a
Campaign Issue in 1972
The McKeithen administration

John McKeithen'

s

.

It was

ironic that Governor

administration was ending amid scandal

because he had been a popular governor, the first in

modern state history to serve two consecutive terms in
office.

The record of McKeithen's first term (1964-68)

was generally considered to have been very good.

He

had begun a successful campaign to induce northern in-

dustries to relocate In Louisiana, and for this achievement, he had earned considerable media and business

community support.

McKeithen's greatest triumph, however,

came unexpectedly in the area of race relations.

19

In the summer of 1965, a group of racial moder-

ates in Bogalusa, Louisiana invited former Congressman

Brooks Hays to speak on the 1964 civil rights act.

Bogalusa is

a

small papermill town located north of New

Orleans in a region that has long been
the Ku Klux Klan.

a

stronghold of

The Klan was unhappy that this

68

"southern integrat ionist " had been invited to speak in its
midst, and it promised to picket the Hays speech.

In

order to avoid a confrontation, the mayor of Bogalusa
urged the sponsors of the Hays speech to withdraw their
invitation.

This created more trouble since black

groups felt that the community should not accede to
the Klan's demands.

They announced their own demonstra-

tions to protest the mayor's actions, and simultaneously,

state black leaders announced that concentrated de-

segregation efforts would begin in Bogalusa. 20
Governor McKeithen realized that black protests
in Bogalusa might erupt in violence between blacks and

whites.

He feared that this violence could then spread

to other sections of the state.

In a surprise move,

the

governor went on statewide television to denounce violence
and also to announce that he was appointing a biracial

committee to mediate the Bogalusa dispute.

In return,

the blacks agreed to a thirty day cooling-off period.

Because of his success with the biracial committee, the

governor decided to appoint

a

permanent statewide com-

mittee to handle any future racial disputes.

For

a

southern governor in 1965, and especially one who had
used the race issue to get elected, McKeithen's actions

were impressive and marked him as one of the racial

moderates of the south.

21

By 1966, Governor McKeithen found himself in a
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unique position for any politician.

His principal oppo-

nents from the 1964 election were no longer factors to
be considered in gubernatorial politics.

Moreover, pub-

lic opinion polls indicated that a large majority of the

state's voters felt that McKeithen was doing
in office.

a

good job

22

McKeithen realized that he had an excellent chance
to be reelected in 1968

.

The only barrier to this was

the 1921 constitution which prohibited the governor from

serving two consecutive terms in office.

Several past

Louisiana governors had skirted this issue by sitting
out four years and then running again when they were

eligible.

For example, Earl Long served his first term as

governor from 19^8 to 1952.

Since he was not eligible

for reelection, Long sat out the next four years.

He

then ran again in 1956 and was elected to another four

year term. 2^-

McKeithen decided that he did not want to sit out
four years.

Therefore, he proposed an amendment to remove

the two term restriction on the governor.

While there

was opposition to the amendment, McKeithen'

s

were persuasive.

arguments

He argued that the restriction against

two consecutive terms unfairly penalized the governor who
had done a good job in office.

McKeithen reasoned that

it was only fair in a democracy to let the voters decide

whether a governor deserved a second term.

He also claimed

s
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that a governor was more likely to do a good job if he

knew he faced an election in four years.

McKeithen readily acknowledged that the Louisiana
governor was already

a

powerful figure in state politics,

and he agreed to support an effort to trim some of the

appointive powers of the governor.

McKeithen appointed

a

ex-governor Sam Jones.

Toward that goal,

blue-ribbon committee headed by
The committee was charged with

making specific recommendations on ways to cut the governor's powers.

Those recommendations (nine amendments

to the constitution) along with the two term amendment

appeared on the ballot in November, 1966, and they
received almost 70% of the vote of those who actually

participated in the amendment election.

25
J

That outcome

also assured that Governor McKeithen would have little

opposition in the 1967 Democratic primaries.

He easily

defeated Congressman John Rarick (winning with 80.6% of
the vote), and the Republican Party did not even bother
to nominate a challenger for the general election.

26

The 1967 primary was the high point of McKeithen'

popularity.

For the next four years, there was one rev-

elation after another concerning corruption in state
government.

Much of the governor's troubles stemmed

from a series of articles which Life magazine ran in
1967 and 1970.

27

Those articles alleged that organized

crime figures had received special treatment from state

s

officials.

One charge related to the special handling

which the Department of Revenue and Taxation had given to
the affairs of reputed crime boss Carlos Marcello.

other Life article charged that Marcello even had
vate telephone line to the governor's office.

2^

Ana

pri-

It was

later shown that only one McKeithen aide had ever had

access to that phone.

That aide resigned; however

McKeithen subsequently appointed him to head the Department of Public Works.

The governor's administrative

judgment was shown to be faulty when that same aide
was indicted on public bribery charges and forced to

resign from the department.

By that time, McKeithen'

reputation was irreparably damaged.

Even the once bright

industrial picture turned sour when labor disputes
broke out in Baton Rouge, the state's capitol.

There was

evidence of labor racketeering, and violence on the worksite was commonplace.

McKeithen appointed another blue-

ribbon committee to mediate the dispute, but this time
he lacked the political resources to force a compromise

solution.

29

By the close of McKeithen's second term,

it

was obvious to most veteran political observers that re-

form was going to be the major issue in the 1971-72 gu-

bernatorial election.

Factional instability, the black vote, and

v oter unrest.

When the 1940 reorganization was attempted, there was

a

strong bifactional system composed of the Long and anti-

72

Long forces.

By 1972,

that system had been replaced by a

multifactlonal system similar to that found in other oneparty states.

In such a system, there are transient poli-

tical alliances which change from one election to another

depending upon the issues and the candidates.
a large

Usually

number of candidates run in the first primary.

For example, there were seventeen candidates entered in
the state's first Democratic primary in 1971.

Each can-

didate in a multifactlonal system tries to capitalize on
what V.O. Key called "localism."

which

a

This is a strategy in

candidate tries to pile up as many votes as pos-

sible in his home area in the hope that this will be suf-

ficient to put him in the runoff primary.

During the

runoff, there is a great deal of trading off as the first

primary victors deal for the votes of the defeated candidates

.

Another new factor in the 1971-72 campaign was
the presence of black political organizations which might
be instrumental in swinging the election to one candidate.

With the passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, the black
vote in Louisiana was becoming an important factor in
state elections.

Its importance had been clearly demon-

strated in the 1970 mayoral election in New Orleans when

Moon Landrieu captured the majority of the organized black
support in the city. 31

Most political observers felt that

it was this support which had enabled Landrieu to win.

Going into the 1971 gubernatorial primaries, the support
of the black political organizations, particularly
those
in the New Orleans area, was seen by potential candidates

as the factor which might determine the outcome of the

governor's race.
However the most important factor in the 1971-72

gubernatorial campaign probably was the degree of public
interest in reform.

It has often been said that Louisiana

voters have a high tolerance for political corruption.
one observer suggested:

As

"Where Louisiana has few peers and

no superiors is in the cavalier spirit with which it meets

political corruption face to face, and passes by with an
op

amiable, almost sympathetic nod." J

The 19^0 reorganiza-

tion struggle shows that it takes a political scandal of

immense proportions to arouse the Louisiana voters to
support reform candidates.

It was evident by 1971 that

Louisiana's voters were once again in one of those rare

reform moods.

Interest had been building since the em-

barrassing revelations about organized crime were published
in Life magazine.

That interest reached a climax when

voters rejected the fifty-three amendments on the ballot
in the November,

1970 general election.

Ever since the adoption of the 1921 constitution,
the Louisiana voters had been besieged by an increasing

number of amendment proposals on the ballot.

The 1921

constitution had made it relatively easy for the legisla-

^

7^

ture to propose amendments, and apparently the legislature
felt no constraint to use the amendment process judiciously.
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As a result,

the number of proposed amendments sub-

mitted to the voters during
dramatically.

In the 1920s,

a

legislative year increased
the number of proposed amend-

ments averaged thirteen; in the 1930s, it was up to twenty;

and in the 1940s, the average was twenty-seven.

By

the 1950s, the voters were deciding on the merits of an

average of thirty-five amendments at every election.
During the 1960s, the voters were being overwhelmed by
an average of forty-nine amendment proposals

.

The sheer volume was not the only burden on the

voters.

The amendments were framed in technical language

and often referred to previous constitutions or to some

obscure statute.

In addition, many amendments dealt with

local issues that were of concern only to the parish or

municipality affected by the proposal.

For instance, in

the November, 1966 election forty-five amendments were on
the ballot.

Twenty-one of these were declared by the

sceretary-of-state to be local in nature.

This meant

that all of the voters would be deciding such issues as:

whether the registrar of voters in Orleans Parish should
be chosen by the city council and whether the sewerage
35
and water rates in New Orleans should be increased.

Obviously few voters statewide had enough information to
make an intelligent decision on these questions.

Yet,

"

^
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year after year, the legislature asked the voters to try.
The voters eventually developed their own method of deal-

ing with the problem:

some indiscriminately approved all

of the amendments while others indiscriminately voted

against all of the amendments.

The majority of the

voters, however, simply refused to participate in the

amendment process.
In the November,

1970 election, there were fifty-

three amendment proposals, of which thirty pertained to
localities.

The Public Affairs Research Council of

Louisiana (abbreviated PAR) pointed out that several of
the proposals contained drafting errors and that others

had the same objective but conflicted.

voters had finally had enough.

A

Apparently the

statewide media cam-

paign was begun to get the voters to reject all of the
amendments.

The outcome of the election showed that only

2k% of the state's registered voters had even bothered
to cast their ballots on election day.

Of those who did

vote however, they overwhelmingly rejected every amendment
As PAR concluded in its post election

on the ballot.

analysis:

"The skies were sunny over Louisiana on

November 3rd, but on November 4th, quite

a

few public

officials seemed to have the distinct impression that
a

storm had hit

.
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In the final analysis,
it was a

it must be concluded that

combination of the political instability, the

black vote, and the voter unrest which made the 1971-72
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gubernatorial campaign unique in Louisiana political history.

The growth of multifactionalism left the political

situation more unstable than usual.

This forced the voters

to contend with a large number of gubernatorial candi-

dates, most of whom were reciting the litany of reform.
The increasing importance of the black vote after 1965

was felt in the sense that politicians now began to

direct their campaigns to black voters.

Finally, the

misuse of the amendment process by the state legislature

produced a voter backlash against all amendment proposals.

Some worthwhile amendments were rejected in the

1970 voter rebellion, but the voters did not seem to
mind.

They were weary of trying to make decisions which

they believed should have been made by the state legislature.

By 1971, many Louisiana voters were coming to

believe that not every politician was "a good 'ole boy!"
The primary campaign

.

Seventeen candidates filed for the

first Democratic primary in 1971.

However not all of them

could be described as "serious" contenders.

Many ob-

viously qualified in the hope that some miracle would put
them in the runoff.

The list of serious candidates in-

cluded: Congressman Edwin Edwards, state senator

J.

Bennett

Johnston (now a United States Senator), former Congressman
Gillis Long (since then, he has been reelected to the
House of Representatives), state senator John Schwegmann
amendments on
(he had led the media campaign against the

the 1970 ballot), and Samuel Bell

(he was an official with

the black political organization SOUL, the Southern Organ-

ization for Unified Leadership).^
The first primary provided the kind of jockeying
for support that one would have expected in a one-party

multifactional system.

Several of the candidates tried

to wrap themselves in the reform mantle by calling for

constitutional revision, administration reorganization,
a

code of ethics for public officials, and financial re-

form (including the abolition of the practice of per-

mitting state agencies to maintain separate bank accounts).
Long, Edwards and Johnston competed fiercely for
the endorsements of the black political organizations.

The New Orleans States-Item later reported that these

three candidates each spent between $50,000 and $100,000
for the endorsements of the major black political organ-

izations in the New Orleans area.^ 0

Most of that support

went to Gillis Long in the first primary.

He was gener-

ally conceded to be the most liberal candidate in the
race.

However, Long's overall support was not broad

enough among other segments of the state's population
to put him into the runoff primary.

third to Johnston and Edwards.

He finished a strong

41

Both Congressman Edwards and Bennett Johnston
could be classified as political moderates.
a solid base of support among the

Edwards had

French-Catholic parishes
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in south Louisiana

was more varied.

(his home area), but Johnston's support

The latter'

s

support ran from his home

area in north Louisiana (primarily the urban area around

Shreveport

)

to the suburban areas across the state.

Al-

though Johnston campaigned vigorously for black political endorsements, Edwards managed to get the majority

of them in the second primary.

Coupled with his solid

base of support in south Louisiana and his strong labor
support, this was enough to give Edwards the margin of
victory.
The Edwards Reorganization Plan

Initiation of the plan

.

Despite Governor Edward's campaign

pledge to institute reform, there remained considerable
doubt whether he would push very hard to carry out those

promises.

The revelations about corruption had left many

voters cynical about the promises of politicians.

As one

Baton Rouge attorney noted, many voters in the state believed that reform in Louisiana consisted of "turning out
the fat hogs and letting the lean hogs in."

J

Those doubts

were largely dispelled after the governor's first address
to the legislature.
In that speech,

Governor Edwards stressed the need

to make Louisiana government "more visible, more reflec-

tive of a society coming to grips with the latter part of
the twentieth century."^

To accomplish this,

the gover-
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nor announced that he was recommending comprehensive reor-

ganization legislation, reform of the state's election
laws, constitutional revision, creation of a consumer

protection agency, abolition of the practice of maintaining separate agency bank accounts, and the institution of new procedures for the collection of state revenues.
The governor readily conceded in his speech that
his legislative package would be a very ambitious one.

However he put the legislature on notice that he expected positive results from his proposals.

He also

warned the legislature that the voters were no longer
in the mood to tolerate "politics as usual."

Recent

events, said Edwards, confirmed that the voters were in
the mood for serious political and administrative reform.

Edwards made it clear to the legislature that he intended
to fight

for a record on which he could successfully run

for reelection in four years.

The first item on the agenda was the reorganiza-

tion of the administrative structure of state government.
The governor had begun to tackle this problem even before
he took office.

He had requested the "Flying Feds" of the

Federal Technical Assistance Program to make

Louisiana's government.

a

study of

What they came up with was

a

plan

to consolidate the state's 267 agencies under 15-25 cabinet

departments

.

^

By the time Edwards took office, he had
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decided, however, on

a

more conservative approach, covering

only those agencies which could be readily reorganized
by legislative enactment.

The reorganization of the con-

stitutional agencies and boards was

a chore that

Edwards

wanted to leave for the constitutional convention which
he was hoping to convene sometime in 1973.

The Edwards reorganization plan called for the

consolidation of 132 state agencies under seven new
cabinet departments:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Professional and Occupational Affairs
Art, Culture, and Historical Preservation
Human Services
Health, Social, and Rehabilitation Services
Environmental Protection
Consumer Protection
Local Affairs, Planning, and Development

In addition,

the plan called for the abolition of thirty-

one dormant agencies, including the Louisiana Sovereignty

Commission and the Louisiana Council on Governmental Reorganization.

Rather than submit the plan as one omnibus

reorganization bill (as suggested by the federal study),
Governor Edwards chose the strategy of submitting the plan
as separate legislative bills.

That way should one or

more of the bills be defeated (and Governor Edwards ap-

parently felt that this was

a

good possibility), the en-

tire reorganization plan would not go down in defeat.

General reaction to the plan

.

^7

There were three contro-

versial sections of the reorganization plan.

The first

called for the transfer of the powers of the state comp-

troller to the office of the state treasurer.

This prob-

ably would not have aroused much opposition were it not
for the fact that both offices were elective.

By pro-

posing a change in their powers, Edwards was violating
the unwritten law that elected administrative officials

should be free to run their departments without inter-

ference from the governor.

Edwards promised to con-

tinue the salary of the incumbent comptroller for his
full four year term.

He also promised to find some new

functions for the comptroller to perform.
little consolation for that official.

But this was

He charged that

the governor had no authority to change the duties of
That, argued the incumbent comptroller,

the office.

could only be accomplished through a constitutional

amendment.
A

1*

8

second part of the governor's plan called for

the transfer of twenty-six parish levee boards to the

Department of Public Works.

From the outset, this prom-

ised to evoke considerable opposition because of the

political nature of the parish levee boards.

The latter

are independent from both local and parish governments.

They are governed by multi-member boards that are ap-

pointed by the governor.^ 9

For the most part, Louisiana

governors have used their levee board appointments to
supplement their regular state patronage.
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Membership on levee boards is highly valued because
the boards are involved in the acquisition of land for
levees as well as their actual construction and maintenance.

Since about one-third of the state must be protected by
levees, levee boards are involved in awarding contracts
and purchasing land valued at several million dollars. 5°

Opposition to the governor's reorganization proposal came
from the levee boards and the contractors who do business

with the levee boards.

They believed that the transfer of

the levee boards to the Department of Public Works would

upset the traditional means by which levee boards con-

ducted their business.

Reaction to the health-welfare proposal

.

The third area

of controversy centered on the consolidation of fifty-

nine agencies under the Department of Health, Social, and

Rehabilitation Services (abbreviated DHSRS).

This depart-

ment would be headed by a commissioner who would serve as
the chief executive authority of the department.

The

agencies affected by the consolidation included all of the
state's general care public hospitals, all state mental

institutions and clinics, all state schools and facilities for the mentally retarded, and the departments of

health, hospitals, and public welfare.
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Given the longstanding fragmentation of the state's

health-welfare system, it is not surprising that some of
the agencies and their supporters opposed the governor's

.

reorganization proposal.
would create

a

Many felt that the consolidation

department which was too large to respond

to the needs of individual citizens.

They did not be-

lieve that the commissioner of this new department

would be able to control all of the agencies supposedly under his jurisdiction.

These people recommended

that the department be given a board with considerable

decision-making authority.

The Louisiana State Medical

Society recommended that the board should be given complete authority over the consolidated department, in-

cluding the power to appoint the commissioner.
board would be chosen from

a

Such a

slate of candidates submitted

by the Louisiana State Medical Society, the Louisiana

Hospital Association, and the State Health Planning

Advisory Committee.

The supporters of the governor's

proposal countered with the argument that the board arrangement would hinder the governor and would in the
long run give too much influence to special interest

groups 52
Other opponents of the health-welfare reorganiza-

tion included Tulane and Louisiana State University (LSU)

medical schools.

These two schools provided most of the

medical staff for Charity Hospital in New Orleans, the

nation's second largest public hospital.

Although

Tulane and LSU did not oppose the consolidation of

Charity Hospital under the umbrella agency, they did

oppose the inclusion of the Health Education Authority
of

Louisiana (HEAL).
The latter agency had been created in

develop

1

968 to

program to increase the number of trained

a

medical personnel in the state.
involved the construction of

a

Part of HEAL's program

new medical complex to

be located next to Charity Hospital and the two medical

schools in downtown New Orleans.

As an independent

authority, HEAL could acquire land for the medical project and also issue revenue bonds to pay for its con-

struction

J
.

Under the original arrangement, Tulane, LSU, and
Charity Hospital were given equal voice in the affairs of
HEAL.

The two medical schools believed that once HEAL

was brought under the umbrella department, the health-

welfare commissioner would become the dominant decision-

making authority.

The schools warned that they were

prepared to leave the HEAL project if the agency were consolidated under DHSRS.

Tulane went so far as to publi-

cize plans for the construction of a separate teaching

hospital run by the university.

Although Tulane did not

actually threaten to withdraw its medical personnel from
Charity Hospital, the clear implication was that this
might happen if HEAL were included in the consolidation.

Others argued that HEAL was primarily an education agency and did not belong in a department that was

5^

.

service oriented.
a

The chairman of HEAL contended that as

state agency, HEAL would no longer be able to acquire

land or sell revenue bonds.

He claimed that if this

happened, it would doom the planned medical complex.

It-

was also claimed by HEAL's supporters that money from

both the federal government and private foundations

would be jeopardized by the consolidation.

Supporters of the reorganization argued that the

exclusion of HEAL from the consolidated department would
defeat the purpose of the consolidation, i.e., to end
the fragmentation in the state's health and welfare system.

Dr.

Charles Mary, the director of Charity Hospital

in New Orleans and one of the key supporters of the re-

organization, argued that HEAL could ultimately become
the chief planning agency for the entire state if it

were included under the umbrella department.

Dr.

Mary

also suggested that if an exception were made for one

agency and one set of interests, then other agencies
and other interests would push for similar exclusions.
If that happened,

idate

there would be little left to consol-
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Given the opposition to portions of his plan,

Governor Edwards had little to gain and much to lose by
fighting to the bitter end.

Since this was only his

first legislative session, it would make no sense to

alienate key members of the legislature.

These legisla-
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tors would be needed to support other legislation
Edwards

wanted passed.

HEAL was

a good

example of an area where

the governor could afford to compromise.

portant to the New Orleans area.

HEAL was im-

Tulane and LSU had

already announced their opposition to the inclusion of

HEAL in the umbrella department.

The two daily news-

papers in New Orleans had editorially opposed the inclusion of HEAL, and most of the Orleans parish delegation
to the legislature was committed to fight for HEAL's ex-

clusion from the reorganization.

Because the governor

needed the votes of the Orleans delegation on other

matters he considered important, it was prudent for

Governor Edwards to compromise on the HEAL matter.
Another factor in the governor's reluctance to
pursue the reorganization struggle was his growing commitment to the adoption of

a

new state constitution.

Midway through the legislative session, it was apparent
that the most important legislative act in the governor's

mind was the call for
1973.

a

constitutional convention in

Governor Edwards was particularly concerned about

the content of that call (i.e., procedures for delegate

selection, the agenda of the convention, etc), and he was

unwilling to jeopardize what he obviously thought would
be the most important achievement of his first term.

In

the end, the governor decided not to fight for a reorgan-

ization plan which he himself admitted was limited.
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Since the constitutional agencies would have to be dealt

with at the convention, it made sense to put off a re-

organization struggle until that time.

Therefore,

Governor Edwards backed away from the controversial
aspects of his reorganization plan.

The result was

that the only significant reorganization passed during
the 1972 legislative session was the health-welfare

consolidation minus the HEAL agency.
The Department of Health, Social
and Rehabilitation Services

Agencies Included In the consolidation

.

With the ex-

ception of HEAL which was finally removed from the con-

solidation bill, the health-welfare reorganization
57
passed as Governor Edwards wanted.

The major depart-

ments included in the new umbrella department were:
1- The State Department of Hospitals and the

State Hospital Board
2- The Board of Administrators of Charity Hospital
of Louisiana at New Orleans
3- The Board of Directors of Confederate Memorial

Medical Center
4- The Department of Health and the State Board

of Health
5- The State Department of Public Welfare and the

State Board of Public Welfare
The largest of the organizational units included
in the consolidation was the State Department of Hospi-

tals.

It was headed by a director who was appointed by

the governor.

The director managed the administrative

affairs of the department and also appointed the heads

o

^

.
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the departmental institutions.

The Hospital Department

had a fifteen member board which was also appointed by
the governor.

That board was supposed to be responsi-

ble for formulating the policies and regulations govern-

ing the institutions and programs operated by the department.

In practice though, the board had very little

authority S8
The State Department of Hospitals operated eight

general care hospitals, one tuberculosis hospital and one

tuberculosis clinic, three mental hospitals, five mental
health community centers, fourteen guidance centers, one
geriatric hospital, and eight schools for the mentally
retarded.

The range of the department's programs

covered the entire state.

In those rural parishes where

there was no state hospital, the department provided free

ambulance service so that patients could be brought to
one of the other state hospitals where the proper care

could be obtained. ^9

With the increased participation

of the federal government in the purchase of medical

care, the department had also begun a program to purchase

medical care for the indigent from private medical care
facilities

.

Included under the new umbrella department were
the state's largest public hospitals: Charity Hospital at

New Orleans and Confederate Memorial Medical Center in

Shreveport.

These two hospitals were operated by their

^

1

own independent boards and were not subject to the State

Department of Hospitals.

Charity Hospital was governed

by a Board of Administrators composed of seventeen mem-

bers, and Confederate Memorial was governed by a thirteen

member Board of Directors.

The Confederate Memorial

Board chose its own hospital director; while the governor chose the director of Charity Hospital.

The gover-

nor also chose the members of both of the hospital boards.

Under the terms of the consolidation, both of these hospitals and their boards would be brought under the control
of the new health-welfare umbrella department.

6

The fourth major department included in the con-

solidation was the Department of Health.

This department

was responsible for controlling the spread of contagious

diseases, enforcing the state's sanitary codes, providing

preventive care for expectant mothers and children, and
collecting the state's vital statistics.

In addition,

the department operated health units in sixty parishes,

public health laboratories, and clinics for crippled

children

.

The department was run by the State Board of

Health.

This board consisted of a president and eight

other members who were all appointed by the governor
for eight year staggered terms.

The board was formally

responsible for making regulations and policy for the
department.

The president of the board also served as

.
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the director of the department
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The fifth major department included in the con-

solidation was the State Department of Public Welfare.
Like the other major departments included in this con-

solidation, it too possessed
of Public Welfare.

a

board, the State Board

The board was formally responsible

for setting overall policies governing the department

and for appointing the commissioner of public welfare.
The latter functioned as the chief executive officer of

the department.

The responsibilities of the department

included the administration of the state's public assistance programs.
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Powers and functions of the new department

.

During the

reorganization debate, there was considerable discussion
about the mission of the new department.

This was an

important question in light of recent developments toward the integration of the human services both at the
state and local levels.

Proponents of the Louisiana

reorganization had argued that the consolidation would
result in: the creation of a new health-welfare agency

which would be capable of identifying those citizens in
need of social services, establishing a list of priority
services, and efficiently delivering those services to
the needy. 65

This description sounds very similar to

66
HEW's definition of services integration.

Based on

this, one might be led to conclude that services inte-

gration, and not consolidation, is the mission of the new

umbrella department.

This is not the case, however.

The final draft of the Louisiana reorganization bill

omits the two key elements of an integrated CHRA: the

divorce of program develooment from services delivery
and the creation of a regional services delivery network. 67
The reorganization bill created eight division

within the umbrella department:
1- Social, Human and Rehabilitative Services
2- Health, Maintenance and Ambulatory Services
3- Hospitals

^-Income Maintenance
5- Mental Health
6- Charity Hospital at New Orleans
7- Adminlstration and Planning Services
8- Education and Research""
The first six divisions correspond to the old program units
(even to the retention of Charity Hospital as a separate

entity), and the last two divisions were supposed to provide management tools for the new health-welfare commis-

sioner

.

With so many agencies brought under the department, it was necessary to assure that the commissioner

would actually be able to coordinate the separate units.
The reorganization bill provided that the commissioner

would be the executive officer of the department.

He

would be responsible for "the administration, control
and operation of the functions, programs, and affairs
of the department."

69

The commissioner was given power

.
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to make all the rules governing the department,
to appoint

advisory commissions, to conduct studies and investigations, to hold hearings, and to restructure the internal

divisions of the department. 70

The latter may be par-

ticularly important since it suggests that at some
time in the future, the commissioner would have the power
to reorient the department toward the services integration

concept.

Moreover, he would be able to accomplish this

without having to go back to the legislature for its

approval
The commissioner is appointed by the governor

and serves at his pleasure.

Although the deputy commis-

sioner is appointed by the commissioner, the heads of
the eight departmental divisions are appointed by the

governor upon the commissioner's recommendation.

reorganization bill also establishes

a

The

fifteen member

Board of Health, Social, and Rehabilitation Services.
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During the reorganization debate, many people had called
for the creation of a board with sole responsibility
for the operations of the department.

However, in the

final draft of the reorganization bill, the board is

clearly made subordinate to the commissioner in health-

welfare policy matters.

The role of the board is to

serve as adviser to both the governor and the commissioner.

Transition phase

.

Since the reorganization bill passed

the legislature on July

1,

1972 and would not go into

'
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effect until January

1,

1973, there was an interval of

six months with which to prepare for the transition.

The legislation specified steps which the agencies were

required to take prior to the effective date of the act.
By September 15,

1972, the agencies were required to

submit to the governor, the commissioner of administration, and the new health-welfare commissioner designate
a list of personnel,

salaries, and job descriptions; an

inventory of office furniture and equipment; all financial
and bookkeeping records; and a summary of all floor space

being used by the agencies.

This information was supposed

to be translated into a "transition plan for consolida-

tion" which had to be submitted to the governor and the

commissioner of administration by November

1,

1972.

That

plan was supposed to detail how the new health-welfare

commissioner proposed to merge the component parts into
one department

.

72

The final phase of the transition was completed

when Governor Edwards named Dr. Charles Mary to head the
new umbrella department.

Dr.

Mary had been one of the

prime movers behind the consolidation concept; thus his
aims could be expected to coincide with those of the

governor.

After his appointment, Dr. Mary indicated

that his initial efforts would be aimed at eliminating
the duplication and competition for the human resources

healthdollar which existed under the state's unreformed
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welfare system. 73
Cone lusions
As this chapter has noted,
a

Louisiana has not been

very hospitable environment for administrative reorgan-

ization.

The comprehensive reorganization attempted by

the reform governor Sam Jones failed when the state

supreme court invalidated first the amendment and then
the state statute which had established the reorganization.

For the next thirty-two years, there was little

reorganization in the state.
This chapter has offered the suggestion that one

reason for the lack of reorganization during this period
lies in the failure of the governors to support reorgan-

ization plans.

In most of the other states, the record

shows that reorganization proposals have been supported
by the governor because they will increase gubernatorial

power over the state policy-making system.

The fact is

that the Louisiana governor does not need this assistance.
A

case could even be made that the Louisiana governor

could lose since reorganization might take away some of
his patronage appointments and make it easier for the

state legislature to participate in decision-making.

Conditions during the 1971-72 election campaign
were very similar to those in 19^0 when the first com-

prehensive proposal was made.

Political corruption and

voter unrest were evident.

The candidates running in

the 1971-72 election camoaign proposed numerous reforms

for state government.

One of those candidates, Congress-

man Edwin Edwards, proposed reorganization as well as

major constitutional revision.
Edwards was elected, and to

a

great many people's

surprise, he made good his promise to propose administrative reform and constitutional revision.

The Edwards re-

organization was comprehensive and also very controversial in some aspects.

In the final analysis, Edwards got

very little of his reorganization plan passed by the

legislature.

He did manage to secure the passage of

legislation consolidating the state's fifty-nine health-

welfare agencies.
a

However, even that legislation was

compromise since the governor was forced to drop plans

to include HEAL in the umbrella department.

welfare legislation did provide for

a

The health-

transition phase,

but a closer examination of it shows that this transition

was limited to an inventory of equipment and the transfer of records to the commissioner's office.

It may

have been an omen that the legislation did not provide
for an inventory of programs and agency goals.

It

certainly seem that any new department head of such

would
a

large agency could have made good use of such an inventory

!

.
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CHAPTER

III

THE EFFECT OF THE REORGANIZATION ON AGENCY

STRUCTURES, DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURES,
AMD PERSONNEL

Introduction
Up to this point, this study has focused solely on

the factors surrounding the consolidation of the fifty-

nine health and welfare agencies under the new umbrella

department.

The purpose of the next three chapters is

to examine what has happened since the reorganization

officially went into effect on January

reorganization a success or a failure?

1,

1973-

Was that

Has it achieved

the monetary savings predicted by Governor Edwards?
it

Has

improved the delivery of health and welfare services

to Louisiana's citizens?

Or,

is this yet another reorgan-

ization attempt that must be consigned to the list of
failures
The task of evaluating the success or failure of
a

reorganization is not an easy one.

In his book on state

reorganization, Frederick Mosher suggests two criteria
for judging the effectiveness of a reorganization.

first criterion is structural effectiveness.
102

1

The

Mosher ex-

.
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plains that

a

reorganization can be classified as struc-

turally effective if the actual formal organization structures, the allocation of power within the organization,
the distribution of organization functions, and the in-

ternal relationships within the organization are modified in accord with the intent of the reorganization
plan.

By this measure, the twelve reorganizations in-

cluded in Mosher's book had some measure of structural

effectiveness.

However, using Mosher's second criterion,

substantive effectiveness
were less effective.

,

those twelve reorganizations

Substantive effectiveness involves

"the appraisal of results against the criteria implicit
in the statement of reorganization goals.'

o

When the

goals are simple and specifically stated and where results
can be objectively measured, an appraisal of substantive

effectiveness can be made.

The problem, though, is that

these conditions are not always present in a particular

reorganization
Mosher lists four of the most persistent problems
in evaluating reorganization.

The first involves the de-

termination of reorganization goals against which the implemented reorganization can be measured.

3

The difficulty

here lies in the fact that different political actors may

have different goals they wish to achieve through reorganization.

Against which should the implemented reorgan-

ization be measured?

Moreover, it is sometimes difficult

.
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to determine the degree of commitment to the
reorganiza-

tion's goals.

For example, when Governor Edwards pre-

dicted monetary savings if his reorganization plan was
adopted, was he actually committing his administration
to the realization of these economies?

Or, was he only

using the predicted savings as

relations gim-

a public

mick designed to build political support for his plan?
A

second problem arises over the assessment of

the results of the reorganization

^

The participants in

the original reorganization decision are most likely to

view the reorganization's results favorably.

Therefore,

one should be cautious in obtaining evaluative state-

ments from the reorganization's participants.

It will

be necessary to balance their statements with more objec-

tive measures such as: budget totals, number of clients

served, type of services offered, and level of services.
A

ization.

third problem involves the "cost" of
It

a

reorgan-

is not just a question of how much money

One must

must be spent implementing the reorganization.

also assess the cost in terms of such factors as: em-

ployee morale, agency output, and disruption of agency
routines.

In the long run,

the latter may be more signi-

ficant in assessing the true impact of a reorganization
than either direct monetary costs or savings.

Finally, there is the problem of time.

6

Mosher

points out that major organizational changes are not nec-

essarily immediately visible to outside observers.

Mosher'

point is that the gradual nature of organizational
change

requires the researcher to employ
his analysis.

a longer time

period for

If the researcher does not use the longer

time period, the likelihood is that his analysis will reveal only a partial picture of the impact of organiza-

tional change.

Given the complexity of reorganizing a large

agency or a large group of agencies, it seems likely that
the impact of a reorganization might also be minimal at
the outset of its official adoption.

It may be,

as Mosher

suggests, that the implementation phase of a reorganization will go on long after the official effective date
has passed.

During that phase, the task of achieving

the reorganization's goals is complicated by personnel

problems in the recently reorganized agencies, by the

changing needs of clients served by the agencies, and by
changes in political-administrative relationships.

Using

a

longer period of time for the analysis should

allow

a

more thorough assessment of the reorganization's

impact as well as these unforseen occurrences.

Integration of Agency Structures
The purpose of Chapters Three and Five is to de-

termine the effectiveness of the 1973 reorganization

using the criteria established by Mosher.

The present
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chapter assesses the structural effectiveness of the reorganization.

It will focus on organizational structures,

decision-making procedures, and agency personnel.
One of the first effects one looks for in judging

the impact of a reorganization is the degree to which

governmental structures have actually been changed by
the adoption of the reorganization plan.

The tradition-

al reorganization literature suggests that one result

of a reorganization is the integration of organizational

structures.

7

It

suggests that it is not enough for a

reorganization to accomplish "bureau shuffling," i.e.,
the shifting of agencies on the organization chart without any accompanying effort to integrate the internal

structures of the affected agencies.

The literature

suggests that reorganization should also include an attempt to integrate the previously independent agencies
into a single new departmental structure.

Presumably,

this would include an effort to eliminate separate

budget, finance, and accounting units.

would be

a

In their place

single unit which would perform all the manage-

ment functions for the reorganized department.

g

How well does the 1973 Louisiana reorganization

conform to this model?

A

close examination shows that

there was a great deal of bureau shuffling but no immediate attempt to fuse the fifty-nine separate units into
one large department.

One need look no further than the

legislation which created the Louisiana Health, Social
and Rehabilitation Services Administration (hereafter,

abbreviated LHSRSA) to see what little integration
was initially accomplished.^
That legislation stated that the fifty-nine agencies, boards and commissions were "merged and consoli-

dated," and it even specified the separate divisions
that were to comprise the new department.

However, the

legislation did not state explicitly that those agencies
were to be abolished or terminated once the reorganization took effect.

As a result,

the old structures

still legally existed alongside the new structures.
The old Department of Public Welfare still legally

existed within the Division of Income Maintenance; the

Department of Hospitals could be found within the new

Division of Hospitals; the Department of Public Health
could be found within the new Division of Health, Main-

tenance and Ambulatory Services; and Charity Hospital
at New Orleans could still be found within the new

Division of Charity Hospital at New Orleans.
The continued separation of Charity Hospital at

New Orleans from the administration of the other state

general care hospitals also indicates what little inte-

gration was actually intended by the enabling legislation.

Had there been a serious effort to integrate

fully the organizational structures of the merged agencies,
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Charity Hospital would certainly have been consolidated
with the other state hospitals under the Division of Hos-

pitals in LHSRSA

.

Yet Charity Hospital remained a separ-

ate organizational entity even after the reorganization

went into effect.

This meant that Charity retained its

own Director, budget and accounting units, purchasing
unit, and personnel unit.

One must therefore conclude

that the term umbrella was

a

of LHSRSA in 1973-

very accurate description

Like an umbrella, LHSRSA provided

only a superficial covering over the separate organiza-

tional entities which comprised it.
One aspect of the 1973 reorganization which may

eventually assist in achieving the goal of integration
was granting the LHSRSA commissioner the authority to

"merge, consolidate, rearrange, create or establish..."
the divisions within the consolidated department.

11

This seemed to indicate that if it were ever politically
and administratively feasible, the commissioner of LHSRSA

would have the necessary power to complete the full inte-

gration of the department.

Indeed, the record shows

that in the five years since the department's creation,

there have been several changes affecting the internal

structures of LHSRSA.
Some have been just cosmetic changes.

For ex-

ample, four of the original divisions of LHSRSA under-

went name changes, and in

197*1,

the name of the umbrella

3

department was itself changed to

a

more manageable title

-

the Louisiana Health and Human Resources Administration. 12

Also in 197^, a new Division of Youth Services was created
by legislative act.

1J

This division was given the respon-

sibility for coordinating and planning the services and

resources available to juvenile delinquents.

It

is inter-

esting to note that during the legislative debate on
this bill there was considerable discussion of the merits
of including the youth correctional institutions

(then

housed in the Department of Corrections with all of the
state's adult correctional facilities) in the new LHSRSA
division.

While this proposal was subsequently rejected,

the creation of the Youth Services Division plus the cre-

ation of the Division of Rehabilitation Services in 1976
may indicate that Louisiana is moving toward the type of

comprehensive human resources agency described in HEW and
Council of State Governments publications.

14

The most important changes, however, have come

about in the disposition of the so-called housekeeping

functions of the umbrella department.

15J

Past reorganiza-

tions have demonstrated that the integration and adequate

financial support of a central housekeeping division is
an essential factor in achieving complete integration of
a reorganized department.

16

Unless the head of the con-

solidated department has management tools at his disposal,
agencies withhe cannot hope to control the many separate

8
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in his department.

These management tools must include

some or all of the following: budgeting, accounting, per-

sonnel, central purchasing, and central planning.

Under the 1973 reorganization, the umbrella de-

partment was given two divisions which conceivably could
have housed all of the management functions of the department.

The first, the Division of Education and Research,

never became operative.

The second, the Division of Ad-

ministration and Planning, has become an important tool
of the LHSRSA commissioners.

The first commissioner, Dr.

Charles Mary, did very little with the division since he
was so often embroiled in political disputes with the
17
governor and the commissioner of administration.

The

second commissioner, Dr. William Stewart (197^-1977) has

accomplished considerable integration of the department's
management functions.
In 1975,

Dr.

Stewart began transferring the separ-

ate budget functions from the operating divisions to the

Division of Management (the name was changed in 1975).

1

Most of these transfers initially came from the Division
of Family Services and the Hospital Division.

Somewhat

later, the Division of Management also developed a Data

Processing section, and this section has been gradually

assuming responsibility for most of the data processing
19
needs of the department.
by
The integration process may have been hastened

.

Ill
a

series of scandals at the huge Charity Hospital complex

in New Orleans.

Throughout 1973 and

197*1,

there were con-

stant revelations of equipment theft, mismanagement in
food purchasing, and numerous unexplained drug losses.

These revelations culminated with a surprise inspection

during 1975 by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Hospitals.

20

As a result of that surprise inspection,

Charity's accreditation was revoked.

The latter action

was the last straw for Governor Edwards since he feared

that loss of accreditation would cause Charity Hospital
to lose federal Medicare and Medicaid funds.

Edwards

directed his commissioner of administration, Charles
Roemer, to find out what was happening at Charity Hospital and to make recommendations on how to solve Charity's

problems 21
This involvement, however, only complicated

matters for Dr. Stewart.

Still new to the commissioner's

job and with very little consolidation already accom-

plished, he was faced with a dilemma.

How could he get

information on what was going on at Charity if the people
at Charity did not know themselves?

drugs actually stolen?

Were the missing

Or, were they only unaccounted for

because of archaic accounting procedures at the hospital?
As long as the commissioner could not give the answers,

he could be sure that the governor and Mr.

Roemer would

continue to be involved with Charity's problems.

There-

"
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fore, if Dr.

Stewart was going to free himself from this

outside "help," he needed to build up the auditing and
data processing functions of the Division of Management,.

Evidence of Dr. Stewart's support for management

activities can be seen in the fact that when Dr. Stewart
became commissioner in

197*1,

the division was budgeted

only $2.8 million and 215 positions for administrative
,
,
activities.

22

By the time Dr.

Stewart left office in

1977, the division was budgeted $18.3 million and 716

positions for administrative activities.

23

Dr.

Stewart's

successor, Dr. William Cherry, seems to be following a

similar course.

For his first full budget year, fiscal

year 1978-1979, Dr. Cherry has requested that the division
be granted a budget of $22.5 million and 1039 positions.

24

Another area in which the effect of reorganization
might be felt lies in the area of agency Ideology.

Anthony

Downs has defined this as:

verbal image of that portion of the good society
relevant to the functions of the particular bureau
concerned, plus the chief means of constructing that
port ion ^5

a

.

In other words,

an agency's ideology expresses the poli-

cy objectives that it wishes to accomplish.

This ideol-

ogy does not necessarily provide an accurate description
of what the agency does.

Downs refers to it as an "ide-

alized version... tailored to act as a public relations

vehicle for them.

26
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Through its ideology, an agency is able to project its objectives to employees as well as to the outside

political environment.

Downs explains that given the

scarcity of available resources and the great amount of
data confronting decision-makers, an agency's ideology

often serves to influence decision-makers to support

particular agency's objectives.

a

2^

Downs also notes that bureaucratic agencies com-

pete fiercely to distribute favorable images of their work

with the public in the hope that their programs will receive public support.

?8

Two examples of this are the

FBI and the United States Marine Corps.

The FBI has for

years carefully cultivated the image of crimefighter and

protector against communist subversion.

The Marine Corps

has built its image by emphasizing its military prepared-

ness and by stressing that the Marines are always the first

American military unit to see combat action.
For those inside an agency, ideology serves an

important function.

It gives employees a sense of identi-

ty with the agency's mission and also provides the secur-

ity of being a member of a group.

In his case study of

the United States Forest Service, Herbert Kaufman des-

cribes the Forest Service ideology that has developed
over the years.

29

Agency members have

ing to an elite group.

a

sense of belong-

Their training in forestry schools,

their unique uniforms, their separate personnel system,

.

Ili4

and the isolation of their field work set them apart
from
the other employees of the federal government.

Thus ideology is an important factor in an agen-

cy's communications with it environment and in its rela-

tionships with its employees.
a

consolidation takes place?

What happens, though, when
One might surmise that the

consolidated department would attempt to submerge the
separate identities of the previously independent agencies and to replace them with the new identity of the con-

solidated department.

It

would seem that as long as the

subunits retain separate identities this poses

a threat

to the consolidated department's ability to integrate the

functions and programs of the reorganized agencies.
all,

After

if a subunit retains a separate identity with legis-

lators and interest groups, there exists the possibility
that it could go over the department head in order to

appeal budget or program cuts.

Perhaps the fact that

a

subunit is able to retain its own separate identity
may encourage opponents of the original consolidation

plan to continue their battle to defeat the goals of the

consolidation
In the case of the Louisiana consolidation, each

of the reorganized agencies retained its own identity

after the consolidation went into effect.

For instance,

if a person was a client of Charity Hospital at New

Orleans prior to the consolidation, he continued to be

served by that agency after the consolidation went into
effect.

For that person, the reorganization meant very

little.

In fact,

the average user of Charity's services

was probably not even aware that the hospital was now
part of a large umbrella department.
Of course, one could argue that the fact that

Charity Hospital retained its same title accounted for
its continued separate identity.

However, it should be

pointed out that other departments also retained their
separate identities despite formal name changes.

The

Public Welfare Department became the Division of Income

Maintenance under LHSRSA; yet for thousands of welfare
clients, this name change meant very little.

Most cli-

ents continued to refer to the new division as the De-

partment of Public Welfare.

Even the governor and the

legislature continued to use the old name.

The first

Executive Budget issued by the Governor's Office after
the reorganization contained the following heading for
the welfare budget:

Division of Income Maintenance
Department of Public Welfare31
In retrospect,

it

should not have been that sur-

prising to discover that the Louisiana umbrella department has had problems developing an identity of its own.

Given the lack of integration in the initial consolidaidention effort plus the existence of well established

tities of several of the reorganized agencies,

it

would

116

have been naive to expect the umbrella department to de-

velop a new Identity immediately.

Complicating matters

for the umbrella department was the name chosen for it:

the Louisiana Health, Social and Rehabilitation Services

Administration.

Even using its initials, LHSRSA, the

title was awkward and unlikely to inspire anything but

confusion when one attempted to verbalize the department's name.

It certainly was a lot easier for a person

to state that he was receiving services from the Welfare

Department than it was for him to say (in one breath)
that he was receiving services from the Louisiana Health,

Social and Rehabilitation Services Administration.

Because of the confusion caused by the umbrella

department's name, the Louisiana legislature changed the
title of the department in 197^.

The new title was the

Louisiana Health and Human Resources Administration
(LHHRA).

Yet, even this name has had difficulty catching

on with the public.

Ironically it seems that some of

the problems encountered by the department

(like the

scandals at Charity and the disagreements between the

commissioner of administration and the first two healthwelfare commissioners) may have contributed to the development of a negative image for the department.

As a matter

of fact, the initials of the department combined with the

numerous problems it has had since the consolidation went
into effect prompted the chairman of the House Appropri-

ations Committee to proclaim that at long
last the um-

brella department was properly named: LA HORROR! 33
In the final analysis,

the Louisiana case does

raise some interesting questions about the possible

relationship between structural integration and agency
identity.

What would have happened had the umbrella

department been more fully integrated from its inception?

Would it have been able to overcome and submerge

the identities of such well established departments as

Charity Hospital and the Department of Public Health
(both of these departments had been organizational enti-

ties for at least one hundred years)?3^

agencies have resisted the pressures of

Could those
a strong,

well-

integrated department?
Perhaps the answer is that certain subunits of an

umbrella department will always retain an identity with
specialized interest groups.

For example, the Office of

Education within the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare retains
tion issues.

a

special identity with respect to educa-

Whether or not an umbrella department tries

to submerge the identities of its component agencies may

depend on its own degree of integration and also on whether

continued separate identities are perceived as
to the consolidated department.

A

a threat

subunit which goes about

its business without interfering with departmental objec-

tives may not be seen as a threat.

However, a controver-
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slal agency or one that balks at orders from the commis-

sioner's office may be seen as a threat.

In that event,

it would seem that the consolidated department would make

an intensified effort to submerge the identity of the

offending subunit.

Decision-Making in the Umbrella Department
One of the biggest problems encountered in the

consolidation of

a

large group of agencies lies in the

area of decision-making.

The head of the consolidated

department is supposed to become the primary decision-

maker for the department.

Individual agencies still

participate in formulating decisions; however it is the
department head who now has the final say.

With all of

the information funnelled to him, it is presumed that he
is in the best position to determine if any undesirable

program duplication is present.

Whenever he finds it,

the department head's job is to eliminate the undesirable

duplication and force the agencies to coordinate their
activities.

The key ingredients in this becoming a real-

ity are that the department head be given full authority

over component agencies, adequate management tools, and

support of the chief executive who appointed him.
often
Of course, the ideal and the reality are

contradictory.

What frequently happens is that the head

little more than
of the consolidated department becomes

a figure head.

This is especially true if the component

agencies are well established with strong ties to clients
and legislators.

In the latter cases, agencies are able

to resist the coordinative efforts of the new department

head.

They go about their normal routines as if the re-

organization had never taken place.
Since the Louisiana reorganization involved such
a

large number of agencies with established routines and

strong political allies, it might have been expected that
the LHSRSA commissioner would have difficulty controlling

the department.

Nevertheless, it should be remembered

that the reorganization legislation did provide the basis
for establishing a strong commissioner.

That legislation

stated that the commissioner would be:
the executive and administrative officer of the state
department of health, social and rehabilitation services.
He shall be responsible for the administration,
control and operation of the functions, programs and
affairs of the department and the policies with respect
thereto and of all institutions and facilities thereof. 35

In addition,

the legislation stated that the commissioner

was to advise the governor on health-welfare issues, and
it gave the LHSRSA commissioner the authority to hold

hearings, conduct investigations, and make rules governing the department.

Coupled with his authority to merge

and consolidate divisions, this legislation seemed to

give the LHSRSA commissioner adequate authority to govern the umbrella department.

.
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The problem with this is that in practice the

LHSRSA commissioners have had to contend with political
and administrative problems that have frequently over-

whelmed them.
er,

Dr.

This seems to be why the first commission-

Charles Mary, did not have as great an impact on

departmental decision-making as one might have expected.
Dr.

Mary had been one of the prime movers behind

the consolidation concept. 36

Although he had not been

a

political supporter of Edwin Edwards during the guber-

natorial election, his selection as the first LHSRSA com-

missioner certainly indicated that he had the governor's
Because of his administrative experience as

confidence.

head of Charity Hospital at New Orleans, most observers

viewed Dr. Mary as the ideal choice to be the first LHSRSA

commissioner
Dr.

Mary was designated commissioner of LHSRSA in

November, 1972.

January

1,

The reorganization went into effect on

1973; however, within ten months, Dr. Mary had
37

become the center of

a

major political controversy.

3

'

In June of 1973, Governor Edwards had approved a

salary hike for the LHSRSA commissioner.

The press immedi-

ately questioned the advisability of giving Dr. Mary an

increase to $55,000

a year.

Governor Edwards justified

the
this increase on the grounds that Dr. Mary had assumed

duties of the recently resigned state health officer.

The

money
governor reasoned that the state was actually saving
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since Dr. Mary was now performing two jobs. 38
Dr.

Mary also experienced problems when

a

legis-

lative audit disclosed that Charity Hospital at New

Orleans had purchased meat at $^.95 a pound and that the

hospital's board members and state legislators often ate
free meals at the hospital.

The audit made the point

that while the board members and state legislators were

getting the expensive grades of meat, hospital patients
were being fed a cheaper, lower grade of meat.
Dr.

Because

Mary had been hospital director while this practice

was going on, he received most of the blame.

Legisla-

tors wanted to know how Dr. Mary and the governor could

justify increased appropriations for the umbrella department when so much money was being wasted on free meals. 39

Governor Edwards initially defended Dr. Mary and
the umbrella department's policies.

peared together at
cisms.

a

He and Dr. Mary ap-

press conference to refute the criti-

They claimed that the practice of giving free meals

to board members and legislators had stopped once Gover-

nor Edwards became governor.

They also pointed out that

within only six months of the consolidation the state had
already saved $10 million.

This total, according to the

governor and Dr. Mary, consisted of:
the state
$4.7 million which the department returned to
general fund
tucdqa
LHonbA
$2.0 million in new federal funds generated by
retirements
early
encouraging
$1.3 million saved by
and by denying merit increases

^
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$2.0 million saved in interest rates and overhead

Both the governor and Dr. Mary predicted that further

savings would be realized before the end of the year.^ 0

However the relationship between Governor Edwards
and Dr. Mary had deteriorated before those additional

savings could be achieved.

Most of the trouble between

Edwards and Mary stemmed from Dr. Mary's attack on the
Family Health Foundation (abbreviated FHF).

The latter

was a private family planning agency with strong ties to

Tulane Medical School.

The dean of the medical scnool

was a member of the Family Health Foundation's board
of directors, and the head of FHF, Dr. Joseph Beasley,

was on the Tulane medical faculty.
The Family Health Foundation held both federal and

state contracts to deliver birth control and other family

planning services to Louisiana's poor.

Apparently, Com-

missioner Mary's interest in FHF contracts began in April,
1973.

At that time,

a

regional HEW official warned him

of certain irregularities in FHF's execution of the con-

tract.

would be

The HEW official also informed Dr. Mary that there
a

federal audit of the manner in which FHF had

executed its federal contract.

In September,

1973, after

completion of his own investigation, Dr. Mary announced
would
at a press conference that the state of Louisiana
not sign another contract with FHF.

With that announce-

to
ment, Dr. Beasley and other FHF officials complained

the governor and Commissioner of Administration
Charles

Roemer.

They intimated that Dr. Mary was professionally

jealous of Dr. Beasley's world-wide reputation as
ily planning expert.

a fam-

They also charged that Dr. Mary

wanted to take over the family planning program, placing
it under the control of the umbrella department.^ 2

The governor apneared to agree with the FHF argu-

ments.

He publicly reprimanded Dr.

Mary and stated that

only the governor had the authority to approve or dis-

approve state contracts.

Despite an attorney-general's

opinion to the contrary, the governor persisted in his
public statements.

Edwards also insisted that he could

find no wrong with FHF, adding that the real problem

seemed to be a personality clash between Commissioner Mary
and Dr. Beasley.^3
In the next seven months, the relationship be-

tween the governor and Dr. Mary deteriorated even further.
There was considerable speculation that Dr. Mary would be
fired.

Governor Edwards continued his public criticism

of his LHSRSA commissioner, charging that Dr. Mary had

spent too much time on the FHF matter and not enough time

attending to the imolementat ion of the health-welfare reorganization.

The governor even went so far as to suggest

that Dr. Mary hire a special assistant to help him with the

consolidation.

The governor added, however, that Dr.

Mary should be willing to take a voluntary pay cut in

12k

order to compensate his new assistant.

Matters were not helped by newspaper reports that
the governor's election campaign had received contribu-

tions from FHF and that both the governor and his brother
had taken trips aboard a plane leased to FHF.
Dr.

Eventually

Mary's position on the FHF matter was vindicated.

The

governor was forced to admit that there was much more to
the FHF case than he had at first realized.

By that time

though, Dr. Mary's relationship with the governor had

deteriorated to the point where he could no longer be
effective as LHSRSA commissioner.

Dr.

Mary resigned

his position on April 5, 197^1.^5
In the final analysis,

Governor Edwards was prob-

ably correct in his assertion that Dr. Mary had spent too

much of his time on the FHF matter.

Once embroiled in a

public dispute with the governor, Dr. Mary had little time
left for departmental concerns.

Yet, before the dispute

came to occupy so much of his time, Dr. Mary took some

administrative actions which illustrated the potential
for the commissioner in decision-making matters affecting

the department.
To begin with,

Dr.

Mary transferred funds from

other programs to the departmental program which tested

children for hearing defects.

The hearing program's

funds had expired before the end of the fiscal year.
If Dr.

Mary had not taken his prompt action, approxi-

mately 142 children would have gone without hearing aids
until

a

new budget was approved by the legislature.

Dr.

Mary again took positive action when the food stamp pro-

gram experienced

a

backlog of applications.

Dr.

Mary's

administrative response was to transfer employees from
other divisions to the Division of Income Maintenance

which had responsibility for the program.

As a result,

the backlog was eliminated in only ten working days.

During his tenure as commissioner, Dr. Mary also instituted central purchasing for hospital equipment and

supplies, saving the state an estimated $500,000.
Overall, Dr. Mary's success as commissioner was

limited by his preoccupation with the FHF problem.

Nevertheless, Dr. Mary's tenure demonstrated that the
concept of health-welfare consolidation could work.

Using

a

consolidated department, the state could save

money, respond more quickly to administrative problems,
and deliver the needed health and welfare services in an

efficient manner.

It would remain for the next commis-

sioner, though, to cope with all of the implementation

problems which Dr. Mary never solved.
Compared to Dr. Mary's term, the second commis-

sioner's was relatively calm.

Dr.

William Stewart a-

chieved more consolidation and increased still further
the role of the commissioner in departmental decision-

making.

As previously indicated, Dr.

Stewart's support

^
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for the consolidation of management functions strengthened
the commissioner.

This action forced component divisions

within LHSRSA to submit their budget requests to the
Division of Management where its auditors could evaluate them against past performances.^

Like his predecessor, Dr. Stewart was also

forced to spend much of his time on the problems of

Charity Hospital and the Family Health Foundation; however, other matters soon occupied part of his time.

The state was ordered by a federal court to place its

emotionally disturbed and mentally retarded children in
state institutions.

For years Louisiana had been housing

them in Texas institutions.

After it was shown that those

Texas institutions often provided substandard and even in-

humane care, the federal court ordered the state to place
those children in licensed facilities within the state.
That court order forced the commissioner to become more

involved with the Divisions of Mental Health and Mental
Retardation.

This involvement eventually resulted in

increased appropriations for the two divisions and also
in a general upgrading of many institutions run by those

divisions

.

While the commissioner's role in the department
has been expanding, that of the governor and the commis-

sioner of administration has also increased.

The numerous

problems confronting the umbrella department have forced

.
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Governor Edwards and Commissioner of Administration Charles
Roemer to take an active role in departmental matters. ^9
This has often produced favorable results in terms of in-

creased appropriations and approval of deficit spending
for the department, but it has no doubt also been a

source of irritation for the commissioner of the um-

brella department.

He has been faced with the prospect

of having the governor and Mr. Roemer constantly looking

over his shoulder.
An example which illustrates this frustration oc-

curred in the firing of two hospital directors at Charity
Hospital.

When Dr. Stewart came into office, one of his

immediate goals was to have Charity Hospital sign

a

formal

affiliation agreement with Tulane and LSU medical schools.
The two medical schools felt that it was time for such a

formal agreement, but Charity's director opposed the

agreement.

He argued that the two medical schools were

trying to take over the hospital.

He also claimed that

if the affiliation agreement were signed, patient care

would be sacrificed.

He claimed that the primary goal

of Charity Hospital would henceforth be the education of

new doctors

When the hospital director refused

a

direct order

from Dr. Stewart to sign the affiliation agreement, he was

promptly fired and replaced with someone who promised to
carry out the commissioner's orders.

That new director,

5

Lee Frazier, was not a doctor.

He was, however, a pro-

fessionally trained hospital administrator and also
the
first black to hold so high a position in Louisiana

government.51

in

September, 1976, Mr. Frazier was forced

to resign because of a dispute with Commissioner of Ad-

ministration Charles Roemer.

The latter felt that Mr.

Frazier had been uncooperative with the management people
Roemer had assigned to Charity Hospital.

Apparently

piqued by this interference with his authority, Dr.
Stewart rehired Lee Frazier as a special assistant to
the LHSRSA commissioner

.

2

Although this was only

a

minor incident, it seems to indicate that Dr. Stewart
did indeed resent "outside" interference from the governor and Mr. Roemer.
In spite of the setbacks,

the commissioner's au-

thority over the umbrella department has gradually increased.

Each commissioner has become more involved in

policy matters affecting the different divisions of the
department.

To some extent, the interest of the commis-

sioner in a particular division seems to be in direct pro-

portion to the degree of publicity given its problems.
Since Charity Hospital has given the commissioner more

trouble than the other divisions, the LHSRSA commissioner has been forced to devote much of his time to solving

the hospital's problems.

As other problems developed,

the commissioner has given his time to other divisions.

The result has been a steady, if slow, increase
in the

commissioner's influence over all aspects of decision-

making in the umbrella department.
there has been

a

With this increase,

corresponding decrease in the ability

of the individual component agencies to make decisions

independent of the commissioner.
Given Governor Edward's personal political in-

vestment in the success of the umbrella department plus
the large investment of the state's resources, it might be

expected that Edwards and Commissioner Roemer will maintain their close surveilance of the department.

VJhen

major problems arise (and, to some extent, Governor
Edwards has defined "major" problems as those which receive considerable and adverse media interest), the

governor and his commissioner of administration will inject themselves in running the department.

Even though

this causes friction between the LHSRSA commissioner
and his political superiors, the situation is not likely
to change until the problems of the department occupy

fewer newspaper headlines.

Governor Edwards has
the consolidation.

a

It must be

remembered that

large political investment in

He has supported the department's

huge budget requests, but he also expects some political

return for his investment 53
.

Even though he appeared at times to resent the

governor's interest, Dr. William Stewart seemed aware of

130

these political realities.

One suspects that his frequent

clashes with Charles Roemer were Dr. Stewart's way of

diverting his annoyance away from the governor.

Even

though Roemer obviously represents the governor in his

dealings with the umbrella department, it was still

convenient for Dr. Stewart to depict Roemer as the
"heavy."

One further suspects that Governor Edwards

purposely uses Charles Roemer in this capacity with
respect to all other state administrators under the

governor's authority.

This strategy allows the gover-

nor his input to the various departments; yet it also

permits the departments to assert their independence
by lashing out at the commissioner of administration 5^
.

Reorganization's Effect on Agency Personnel
Previous reorganization studies have indicated
that there is frequently employee resistance to massive

consolidation 55
.

This stems from their fears about the

unknown effects of reorganization.

Employees are not

certain whether their jobs will be secure under the reorganization.

They are also apprehensive that estab-

lished working relationships within the agency and between the agency and outside political actors will be

adversely affected by the reorganization.

For these

reasons, employees sometimes provide the most visible

resistance to reorganization plans.

Failing in these
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efforts, employees may resort to "guerilla warfare" as
they try to sabotage the reorganization during the imple-

mentation phase. 56
Based on these observations from other studies,
one might have expected more vigorous opposition from
the employees of agencies affected by the health-welfare

consolidation.

In view of Governor Edwards'

emphasis on

the savings that would result from the consolidation,

those employees would have been expected to be very
vocal in their opposition to the plan.

On the contrary,

the opposition during the adoption stage was minimal.

Perhaps because of the strong support given the plan by
the governor, the state health officer, and the director
of Charity Hospital, the employees might have felt that
it was pointless to oppose the massive consolidation pro-

posal.

On the other hand, the employees of the affected

agencies may not have felt threatened by the plan.

They

may have felt that the reorganization would amount to
little more than an artificial covering over their agencies.

They may also have thought that established agency

routines would not be affected despite what the governor
and his supporters predicted.
The only significant employee opposition to the

reorganization came after the plan went into effect.
Among those agencies scheduled to be consolidated under

LHSRSA's umbrella was the Orleans Parish Health Depart-
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ment.57

Although all of the other parish health units

were under the control and supervision of the State

Health Department, the New Orleans health -unit had always
been an independent entity.

It had never had any formal

organizational ties with the state department.

In fact,

it was a charter agency of New Orleans city government.

Also, unlike the other parish health units, the New

Orleans unit was under the city's civil service and was

financed totally by local funding (except for

a

small

amount of federal funds

After the 1973 reorganization went into effect,
the new umbrella department made formal plans to consoli-

date the Orleans Parish Health Department.

The problem

was that the employees of that department did not want to
be brought under the state civil service.

Apparently,

the city employees were worried about seniority, job

classification, and pension benefits under the state civil
service system.

After the health department's employees

threatened mass resignations, the city's elected officials
decided to support their cause.

The New Orleans city

council instructed the city attorney to file suit charging that the 1972 reorganization legislation was uncon-

stitutional because it violated the city's home rule

charter 59
.

As a result, the consolidation of the Orleans Par-

ish health unit was delayed eighteen months while city

officials and representatives from LHSRSA negotiated

a

settlement that would be acceptable to the city
health
unit's employees.
August, 1974.

The agreement was finally reached in

Under the terms of that agreement, the

city's health unit would be merged into the umbrella

department.

However, the city employees would be given

the option of transferring to the state civil service
or remaining with the city civil service.

If they chose

the latter option, they would be transferred to another

city department 6°
.

Although there have been other employee related

problems since the reorganization went into effect, it
is not possible to determine the extent to which these

are the direct result of the reorganization.

The prob-

lems at Charity Hospital created numerous morale problems at that large institution.

The loss of hospital

accreditation lowered the morale of the young doctors
In training at Charity.

Staff physicians were upset at

the rapid turnover of hospital directors and also at the

signing of the affiliation agreement between Charity and
the two medical schools.

The staff physicians feared

that Charity would now become primarily a teaching insti

tution and that the quality of patient care would deteri
orate.

It

is very likely that those staff physicians

were also worried about the security of their jobs in
in the event that Tulane and LSU actually did increase

^
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their influence over the hospital.

Since many of the

staff physicians were not on the Tulane and LSU medical

faculties, there may have been some justification for
their fears.

Those fears could only have been increased

when Dr. William Stewart, the LSU medical school chancellor, became the LHSRSA commissioner in

197*1.

And, when

Stewart gave the order to sign the affiliation agreement,
it

seemed that their worst fear had been realized.

1

Morale problems also developed in the Division
of Income Maintenance (formerly the Department of Public

Welfare).

Its problems mostly involved the New Orleans

office of the division.

That office was beset by a back-

log of welfare applications.

In addition, there were

charges that some of the welfare workers in the office
had placed themselves on the welfare rolls.

In order

to cut down on the alleged welfare fraud, the division's

director ordered the case workers to make more frequent
home visits, even if it meant going into the city's

housing projects where the crime rate was very high.
Case workers were very upset by these orders and also by
the fact that the division head sent in an outsider to

"clean up" the New Orleans office.

Eventually the

problems in that office were relieved when the division
head removed the New Orleans director and replaced her

with someone else who would see to it that the office's

backlog and the welfare fraud were eliminated.

Furthermore,
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the division head relented with respect to his
order that

case workers had to go into high crime areas.

He finally

agreed that welfare workers would only have to go into
those areas if they were accompanied by

a

police escort. 62

It may well be that greater problems have not

developed because the consolidation has not been shown
to be a threat to employee job security.

Before the re-

organization ever went into effect, there was considerable
discussion about possible economies which might result.
It

should be noted, though, that there was never any

mention of massive firings or layoffs.

On the contrary,

both Governor Edwards and Dr. Mary went out of their way
to assure employees that there would be no such drastic

actions.

At the very first meeting of the new depart-

ment's advisory board, Dr. Mary stated:
I want to make it very clear neither the administration nor the board is going to go into any sort of
massive firings and layoffs. We will use natural
attrition and transfer to we hope reduce the total
...Other
table of organization in other actions.
sections will need strengthening, and personnel
will have to be moved from one area where there is
strength to another where there is not. 63

Later, Dr. Mary announced that the department would also

encourage early retirements in order to get the number of

departmental personnel down to
As Table

1

a

more manageable level.

shows, the number of employees in the

umbrella department has increased steadily since the re-

organization went into effect.

The agencies targeted for

s

.
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consolidation were budgeted for 21, 7145 positions in
fiscal year 1972-73.

Each year since then, the total

has increased, with the figure reaching almost 27,000
by the 1977-78 fiscal year.

Thus, employees appear to

have been correct in assuming that the consolidation

would not threaten job security.
TABLE

1

NUMBER OF PERSONNEL IN LHSRSA

Fiscal
Year

Agency
Requests

Governor
Recommendations

Budgeted by
Legislature

1973-7^
1974-75
1975-76
1976-77
1977-78
1978-79

29,650
23,813
29,218
28,446
29,107
28,968

22,153
23,294
25,130
26,676
26,600

22,484
25,069
25,655
26,458
26,887

'

27 ,292

Source: State of Louisiana.
Years 1973-74 through 1978-79-

n a
.

Executive Budget

,

Fiscal

Conclusions

Using Mosher's criterion, it must be concluded
that the Louisiana reorganization has not been completely

effective from

a

structural standpoint.

The structures

of the independent agencies merged under the umbrella

department were not substantially changed by the initial

reorganization legislation.

Whether intentional or not,

137

the 1972 reorganization legislation had not specified
that
the merged agencies would cease to exist once the
reorgan-

ization took effect.

This left the old organizational

structures coexisting alongside the new ones.
The umbrella department has had some difficulty

developing

a

separate identity for itself.

Since the

divisions are still roughly divided along old organizational lines, each has retained its separate identity
for clients and others in the political system.

The

umbrella department has begun to establish its own identity, but this is partly because of the numerous political and administrative problems it has encountered since
the reorganization took effect.

That identity for many

in Louisiana is a negative one.

Even though the Louisiana reorganization has had
only a limited degree of structural effectiveness, this
has not detracted from the commissioners' efforts to gain

more control over the decision-making procedures in the
new department.

Principally because of the efforts of the

second LHSRSA commissioner, Dr. William Stewart, the com-

missioner has increased his authority over the department.
Dr.

Stewart supported the growth of the Division of Manage-

ment, and he has used this division in his efforts to gain

control over the operating divisions of the department.
The governor and the commissioner of administra-

tion retain an active interest in the affairs of the

urn-
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brella department.

As was shown in this chapter, that

interest is primarily the result of the numerous admin-

istrative and political problems which have beset the
new department since the reorganization.

As long as

these problems persist, one can predict that Governor

Edwards and Mr. Roemer will maintain more than just

a

passing interest in LHSRSA.
Finally, this chapter has shown that the reorgan-

ization did not substantially lower the morale of agency
employees.

In large measure, this was due to the efforts

of Governor Edwards and the first LHSRSA commissioner,
Dr.

Charles Mary.

Both went out of their way to assure

employees that there would be no massive firings or layoffs once the reorganization took effect.

The loss in

morale that has taken place seems to be the direct result of other problems

(like the mismanagement at Charity

and the alleged fraud in the welfare division) rather than
the result of reorganization.

The only major employee

problem which developed directly because of the reorganization was the problem with the Orleans Parish Health
Department.

That, however, involved only one small agen-

cy within LHSRSA'

s

umbrella.

:
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CHAPTER

IV

THE POLITICAL- ADMINISTRATIVE ENVIRONMENT AND
THE HEALTH-WELFARE REORGANIZATION

Introduction
As indicated in Chapter

I

of this case study, ad-

ministrative agencies often oppose change simply because
they are uncertain how it will affect them.

1

In the case

of a large-scale consolidation, the affected agencies are

afraid that consolidation will result in the erection
of barriers between themselves and the other political

actors in the system.

They believe that consolidation

will force them to establish a whole new set of relationships with the political actors in their environment.
In spite of these oft-expressed fears, consolida-

tion at the state level does take place.

But the question

remains: Does reorganization produce the results feared by

administrative agencies?

While the literature on this par-

ticular aspect of the reorganization issue is sparse, it
suggests that the results are not nearly as detrimental as
those envisioned by the administrative agencies.

Francis

Rourke's case study of the consolidation of the federal

employment security program demonstrates that existing
li»5

1116

patterns of administrative communications can be
carried
on despite a formal change on the organization
chart.

2

This would tend to suggest that agencies probably
do
not have as much to fear from reorganization as they
suspect.

However, for those proposing reorganizations or

any other major changes in organizational behavior,

Rourke's findings underscore the pitfalls that can arise

during the implementation stage.

Lest any reorganiza-

tion proponent think his job over once a legislature ap-

proves a reorganization bill, the Rourke case study

clearly shows that it is in the implementation process

where the success or failure of the reorganization's
goals is determined.
The purpose of the present chapter is to examine

what effect the 1973 reorganization has had on the politi-

cal-administrative relationships in Louisiana.

What is

the relationship between the umbrella department and the

other political actors in the state?

Has this changed

greatly from the previous situation when the fifty-nine
separate agencies, boards and commissions were inter-

acting with the political-administrative environment?
Governor Edwards, the Commissioner
of Administration and LHSRSA
It

is evident to anyone familiar with Louisiana

government that Governor Edwards and his commissioner of

administration are deeply involved in the operation of
the umbrella department.

The question is whether this is

the result of the recent reorganization

some other factors.

or'

the result of

In searching for an answer to this

question, it will be necessary to look briefly at recent

Louisiana politics.

However, before doing so, it might be

helpful to reexamine the role of the governor with respect to the state bureaucracy.
The greatly expanded state bureaucracy with all
of its complex programs and problems has tended to focus

public attention on the governor's role as manager of
state government.

A

1

966 study by Thomas Anton drew a

gloomy picture of the governor as

a

political novice with

no prior administrative experience and with no special-

ized knowledge of complex policy issues.

3

it

is inter-

esting to note that Anton found the governor (Anton's
study focused specifically on the Illinois governor)

keenly aware of his own shortcomings in dealing with the

bureaucracy.

Anton noted that the governor tends to con-

centrate his political resources on

a

particular agency

or policy area (either as a result of personal interest
in the policy area or in response to what the governor

and his staff perceive to be a public crisis).

Despite

the governor's attempts to initiate change, he has little

effect on the administrative system.

Anton concluded

that the governor's change efforts are actually more
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symbolic than substantive.

According to Anton, the real

meaning of the governor's change proposals is to demonstrate to the system that it cannot get along without him.
A

more recent study by Martha Weinberg confirms

many of Anton's observations.^

Weinberg's study covers

the administration of Massachusetts governor Francis

Sargent (1969-197^

)

.

She concentrates on Governor

Sargent's relationships with four state agencies: the

Department of Public Welfare, the Department of Public
Works, the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency, and the

Department of Mental Health.
When Francis Sargent became governor in 1969, he
did not fit the Anton stereotype: no administrative exper-

ience and no knowledge of detailed, technical matters.

On

the contrary, Sargent seemed the ideal "manager" type.

He

had served as the head of two state agencies: the Depart-

ment of Public Works and the Department of Natural Resources.

He had also served as the lieutenant-governor

under Governor John Volpe.

With such an extensive admin-

istrative background, one might have guessed that Sargent
would be very interested in administrative matters.

This

was not the case however.

Governor Sargent did not consider himself the typical manager attending to the day-to-day governmental problems.

He described his own approach to management as that

of "managing crises."

He preferred to remain apart from

5

1*19

administrative matters until he or his staff perceived
crisis.

At that point,

Sargent would become involved,

sorting through the opposing positions

and-

choosing what

he though to be the best solution to the problem.

interesting to note that Sargent was not
tiator.

a

a

It

is

policy ini-

Given his background, one might have expected

him to take an active role in the policy initiation process.

Such was not Sargent's style!

In fact, Weinberg

suggests that his ability to remain divorced from policy

advocacy probably made it easier for him to play the role
of mediator in times of crises.

Finally, Weinberg's study is important because
she points out that not only are there different styles of

gubernatorial management, but there are also different
situations which require

a

particular style.

For in-

stance, an "advocate governor" is required when there is
a

need to place particular items on the public agenda.

In that event,

the public needs to elect someone who

will take the lead in advocating a certain policy.

times, there is need for

a

Some-

person who "is good at identi-

fying and encouraging the development of technocratic
or bureaucratic issues and who is willing to give them
a

prominent place on his agenda." 6

At other times, there

is a need for a person who is capable of responding

quickly to changes in public opinion.

Weinberg concludes

imthat the role of the public is to "recognize that the

9
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portant question to ask about a governor is not 'How good
is he at management?'

but instead,

'What kind of manage-

ment needs to be done and what kind of elected manager
does this call for?' "7
As indicated previously, Governor Edwards and

his commissioner of administration have shown a great deal
of attention to the new health-welfare department.

To

those familiar with recent Louisiana politics, this in-

volvement may not at first seem unusual.

Part of the

legacy left by Huey Long and his followers was a type of
rural liberalism which advocated high governmental ex-

penditures for the benefit of the needy poor.^
these increased expenditures, the Longs built

With
a state-

wide system of public hospitals (setting very lenient

eligibility standards for free hospital care), established a contract bed program whereby medical services
for the needy could be purchased from private hospitals,

established

a

state dental program, provided free ambu-

lance service, and established a lenient old age assist-

ance program.
The costs of these programs were high.

19^8-^9, Governor Earl

K.

In fiscal

Long allocated 30.9% of the

10
state's budget to health and welfare programs.

By

fiscal 1972-73, the percentage allocated to health and

welfare was 26.^, but the actual dollar figure was
$522 million. 11

This made health-welfare the second most
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expensive program next to public education.

During the

1972-73 period, the state spent almost $729 million
for
all levels of public education. 12
In spite of these high costs,

have attacked the Long programs.

few politicians

Like the New Deal pro-

grams of Franklin Roosevelt, the Long social-welfare programs have become firmly entrenched as legitimate public

programs for state government.

For a Louisiana politi-

cian to attack them would amount to political suicide.

Therefore, most politicians feel it is safer to proclaim

their support for the programs.

In the case of the anti-

Long candidate Sam Jones, he not only affirmed his support for the Long programs, but he also promised to in-

crease their benef it s

.

3

It would be naive to suggest that the Longs sup-

ported social-welfare programs solely out of
commitment.

a

humanistic

The truth is that these programs were an

important instrument in their ability to maintain control
It was common practice for the

over state government.

Long faction to increase old age pension benefits during
an election year.

Furthermore, hospital directors were

routinely chosen on the basis of their political loyalty
to the Longs.

In 1948, Earl Long asked the state legis-

lature to create boards for each of the state's hospitals.

His purpose was solely to increase the patronage

power of the governor.

1^

152

Still another factor which may partially explain
the Louisiana governor's interest in health and welfare

matters may

-be

traced to the historical weakness of local

government in this state.

State government in Louisiana

has assumed many of the functions usually provided by

local governments in other states.

In his study of state

spending, Ira Sharkansky discovered that this situation
is not unique to Louisiana.

He found that most low in-

come states tend to rely on state collected revenues to

finance many public services (including health and welfare services).

Since local governments in these states

do not have the economic resources to support even a

minimum level of public services, the pattern has been
for local officials to look to state government to

finance a great percentage of public services.

J

Be-

cause of the governor's dominance over Louisiana government, the tendency in this state has been for local

officials to appeal directly to the governor.
Thus, one could conclude with some justification

that it is "normal" for Louisiana governors to become in-

volved in health-welfare matters.

The problem with this

conclusion, though, is that Governor Edwards has been

much more involved in this policy area than any of his
recent predecessors.

It

is possible that his interest is

it
solely the result of the 1973 reorganization; however,

responsible.
is also conceivable that other factors may be

7

The first factor has to do with the political

importance of the black vote in recent Louisiana elections.

As already noted in this paper, the black
vote

has become an important consideration for any candidate

desiring to put together

a

winning coalition.

1^

It

is

quite possible that Edwin Edwards' intense interest in

health-welfare matters stems from his desire to appeal
to black voters.

On the other hand, a case could also

be made that it was the governor's personal background

which accounts for his interest in health-welfare matters.

Governor Edwards is from
parish.

a

relatively poor, rural

Having grown up in such surroundings, it might

have been expected that Edwards would have had some first
hand contact with the state's health-welfare system.
This fact was confirmed during the 1971-72 electoral

campaign when Edwards related the story of his first encounter with the state's charity hospital system.
Edwards tells it: as

a

As

young boy, Edwards needed medical

treatment which he could not receive in his home parish.
Therefore, Edwards was sent by bus

(a

free service pro-

vided rural residents in the state) to Charity Hospital
in New Orleans where he received the treatment he needed.

Edwards would conclude this anecdote by stressing that
this personal experience had left him with a deep com-

mitment to the continuation of quality health and welfare
services provided by the state.

1

15*J

While all of these factors (personal, political
and historical) explain part of the reason for the gover-

nor's interest in health and welfare matters, they do
not explain his, and Commissioner Roemer's, constant

involvement in the day-to-day affairs of the department.
The only explanation seems to be that the administrative
and political problems arising from the reorganization

have forced Edwards and Roemer to maintain a close super-

vision of LHSRSA.

This involvement is made even more

significant in view of the fact that Governor Edwards is
not known to be good at or particularly fond of manage-

ment.

Indeed, it has often been said by political ob-

servers in the state that Edwards is more suited to de-

veloping ideas than he is to implementing them.

To the

governor's credit, he has surrounded himself with the

management types who can implement his ideas.
Commissioner of Administration Charles Roemer is
the prime example of this.

governor as

a

troubleshooter

He has often been used by the
.

For example, it was Mr.

Roemer who was sent by the governor to clear up the

problems with the New Orleans Superdome.

That stadium

was wracked by political scandal and mismanagement even

before its official opening.

Not wanting to interfere

with local politicians who were awarding stadium contracts
on the basis of personal friendship and political loyit apalty, the governor allowed this to continue until
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peared that the state's reputation and financial status
were in jeopardy.

At that point, the governor assigned

Charles Roemer the task of putting the huge stadium complex in order.

Roemer responded by bringing in his own

management people from the Division of Administration.
While Roemer never completely solved all of the stadium's financial and management problems, he did at least

bring them under control.

Eventually, at Roemer's sug-

gestion, the operation of the stadium was turned over to
a

professional management firm.

1"

Roemer has played much the same role for the governor with respect to the problems of the umbrella department.

It

was Roemer who was assigned the task of finding

out what was going on at Charity Hospital in New Orleans.

The result was that the hospital's management was substan-

tially improved.
its accreditation.

Eventually, the hospital also won back
However, if anyone got in Roemer's way

(as did Charity Hospital's director),

he was forced out.

19

With each new crisis, the governor's and Mr.

Roemer's involvement in LHSRSA's activities has increased.
The governor and Mr. Roemer were drawn into the Family

Health Foundation controversy, the problems with the state

welfare program, the controversy surrounding the signing
of the affiliation agreement between Charity Hospital and

the two medical schools, and the problems with the state's

program for treating emotionally disturbed and mentally
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retarded children. 20

In the long run, this involvement

has probably been greater than LHSRSA's commissioners

would have liked.

However, it must be recognized how

much is at stake politically.

The department is the

largest in state government, has the second highest
budget, and operates many controversial programs.

The

governor first involved himself when he proposed the

consolidation of the state's health and welfare agencies.

He has been forced to continue his involvement

because one crisis after another in the department has

demanded his and Roemer's attention.

The fact is that

not all of the problems in LHSRSA are major ones.

Cer-

tainly, drug thefts in hospitals are quite common and

ordinarily are not important enough to warrant media and

legislative attention.

But, when those problems occur

within one of LHSRSA's divisions (e.g., the drug thefts
at Charity Hospital), they seem to take on new proportions.

The chances are that if the same problems occurred in

smaller, less controversial departments, not very much

attention would be drawn to them.
There have been many positive benefits to come
out of the governor's involvement in the umbrella depart-

ment.

The governor has publicly committed himself to the

success of the reorganization.

This means that he must

support LHSRSA's commissioners, its policies, and its

budget requests.

If he does not provide the department

.
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with enough support and the reorganization subsequently
fails, his critics will surely point to this as the

reason
Nowhere is the governor's support more evident
or more important than in his recommendations for

LHSRSA's Division of Management.

Past reorganizations

in other states have shown that if a large consolidated

department does not develop adequate management tools
for the department head, then there is little likeli-

hood that the consolidation attempt will succeed.

21

For

this reason, all of the commissioners of LHSRSA have sup-

ported the growth of the management division.
Tables

2

and

3

And, as

indicate, Governor Edwards has also con-

sistently supported the growth of the division.

While

not acceding to all of the commissioners' requests, he

has granted significant budget and personnel increases
for the division.

On average, Governor Edwards has

granted 81.2% of the department's requests for appropriations and 85.8% of the department's request for personnel

.

Governor Edwards' support becomes even more significant when measured against the record of other governors.

The most publicized recent reorganization occurred

in Georgia when Jimmy Carter was governor.

The most

telling criticism of the Carter reorganization

is that he

created
failed to support management functions in the newly

ss
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TABLE

2

APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE DIVISION OF MANAGEMENT
(ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES ONLY)*

Fiscal
Year

Agency
Requests

Governor
Recommendations

1973-7^

$

2,281,041
2,289,065
$ 5,994,675
$17,145,729
$17,042,671
$22,556,232

$

197-4-75
1975- 76
1976- 77
1977- 78
1978- 79

$

$

1,823,287
2,238,249

$

2^1490,599

'

SOURCE: Louisiana, Executive Budget
1973-74 through 1978-79.

$12,381,012
$15,066,190
$16,733,532

.

Fiscal years

*The Division of Management has periodically been a
catch-all for some programs that technically do not beSuch a program was the family
long in a management unit.
After the state took over the operaplanning program.
tion of the program from the defunct Family Health Foundation, it was temporarily placed within the management
In the belief that figures for such programs
division.
do not accurately reflect the governor's support for
management functions, they have been omitted from Tables
2 and 3-

TABLE

3

PERSONNEL GRANTED THE DIVISION OF MANAGEMENT
(ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES ONLY)*

Fiscal
Year
1973- 74
1974- 75
1975- 76
1976- 77
1977- 78

Agency
Requests

114
123
354
921
862

Governor
Recommendations
'

110
123
224
703
820

s
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TABLE 3-Contlnued

Fiscal
Year

Agency
Request s

Governor
Recommendations

1978-79

1039

865

'

SOURCE: Louisiana, Executive Budget
1973-7^ through 1978-79*See note for Table

.

Fiscal years

2.

Department of Human Resources.

At a

1

97 4

conference spon-

sored by the American Society for Public Administration,

James Parham (who was then deputy commissioner of the

Georgia Department of Human Resources) pointed out that
one of the major problems encountered by his department

was Governor Carter's "arbitrary presumption of economy

.

"

Apparently in an attempt to show immediate econ-

omies resulting from his reorganization, Governor Carter

reduced administrative support personnel by one hundred

positions during the first year of the department's operation.

Parham contended that it was virtually impossible

to achieve real integration of the department after Carter

made those cuts. 23

Governor Carter's actions were liter-

ally like "cutting off one's nose to spite his face."

Carter was able to show the public some instant economies,
but those economies may have jeopardized whatever real

benefits might have come from the reorganization.

.
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By comparison, Governor Edwards has demonstrated

that he is willing to forgo the instant economies in

favor of the slower integration process.

It

is not that

Edwards does not want to achieve financial savings through

reorganization.

On the contrary, Edwards campaigned on

the issue of reorganization, and he promised savings

would result from his reorganization.

After the health-

welfare reorganization went into effect, the governor
was able to hold

a

press conference to announce that re-

organization had saved the state $10 million in only six
months of operation.
data in Tables

2

and

Yet, if one looks closely at the
3,

it

is clear that Governor Edwards

has not tried to achieve financial savings at the expense
of consolidation or of the programs operated by the de-

partment.

He has,

in fact, been very generous in granting

the requests of the department for additonal funds and

personnel
As indicated in the preceding discussion, the

1973 reorganization has altered the degree of involvement
of the governor and the commissioner of administration
in health-welfare matters.

Since Huey Long's time,

Louisiana governors have been strong supporters of health
and welfare programs.

As was seen, an important part of

the Longs' political appeal was their support for in-

creased expenditures for health and welfare services.
Also, the Longs frequently used appointments to health-

161

welfare agencies to supplement their patronage power.
It must be concluded,

then, that the health-welfare sys-

tem was accustomed to having the governor assume the
lead in the formation of health and welfare policy.

Edwards has gone beyond this.

He has involved

himself, through his commissioner of administration, in
the day-to-day management affairs of the umbrella depart-

ment.

What makes this so interesting is that Governor

Edwards is not really the management type.

To compensate

for his lack of management ability, he has used his com-

missioner of administration as
istrative problems.

a

troubleshooter for admin-

In some situations

(such as the prob-

lems at Charity Hospital), the governor has assigned his

commissioner to "take over" certain aspects of the department's operations.

Obviously this has caused some

friction since LHSRSA department officials have tended
to see this as excessive outside interference.

Despite

these objections, it seems safe to conclude that LHSRSA
and its divisions can continue to expect such close scru-

tiny as long as Edwin Edwards remains the governor.

The

interesting question is whether the next governor can
pay this much attention to the department unless he too
has a commissioner of administration like Charles Roemer.
One suspects that the answer will be no!
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The Legislature and the Umbrella Department

Based on past experiences, the new umbrella de-

partment's officials could have expected little involvement with the legislature.

In a state where the governor

has historically dominated the legislature, this is not
a

difficult conclusion to reach.

Louisiana legislatures

have generally followed the governor's lead.

They pass

the legislation he wants, and they approve the budgets
he submits.

On an individual basis,

some legislators

have become very involved in specific policy areas.

For

instance, it is customary for legislators to push the

interests of the state hospitals located in their districts.

Legislators have wanted to assure that their lo-

cal state hospitals receive adequate funding and that the

governor appoints "the right persons" to the hospital's
advisory board.
This situation is slowly changing as the legis-

lature attempts to assert its independence from the governor.

Reflective of this trend is the creation of

lative fiscal office.

a

legis-

In late 197^, the legislature ap-

pointed a fiscal officer to advise it on revenue and
budget matters.

2^

Since the fiscal officer's appointment,

he has become an important element in the legislature's

dealings with the governor and the executive branch.

He

Commissioner
has been at odds with Governor Edwards and
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Roemer almost since his appointment.

He has disputed rev-

enue estimates submitted by the Division of Administration, he has challenged Roemer'

s

approval of agency def-

icit spending, and he has been very critical of what he

alleges to be the bloated budget requests of most state
agencies.

While the legislature still has

a

long way

to go before it can accurately proclaim its independence

from the governor, the appointment of the legislative

fiscal officer constitutes a step in that direction.
It must be

acknowledged that the umbrella depart-

ment represents a highly visible target.

LHSRSA is the

single largest agency in state government.

Its budget

for the fiscal year 1977-78 was over $900 million, and it

employed approximately 27,000 people.

2^

The state does

spend more on the total education budget, but that budget
is divided among several independent agencies.

?6

There-

fore, it would seem reasonable to expect that if there are

any stirrings of legislative independence, then they

would probably be apparent in the legislature's relationship with LHSRSA.

Looking at this relationship over the past five
years, the pattern seems to be for the legislature to

stress the "mismanagement" in the umbrella department.
For example, the legislature criticized Dr. Mary for

Charity Hospital's practice of feeding expensive cuts of
27
meat to the hsopital's board members.

The legislature
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has also been highly critical of the state's free
dental

care program. 28

That program is part of LHSRSA's Early

and Periodic Screening and Diagnostic Treatment Program.
As the name of the program implies, it tries to prevent

illness before it occurs.
The goal of the dental program is to provide free

dental care to needy children from birth to twenty-one

years of age.

The program incurred a $^.7 million deficit

($3.8 million in federal funds and $836,000 in state funds)

during the fiscal year 197^-75

29
.

Legislators immedi-

ately attacked this program and the umbrella department.
They charged that some dentists were "ripping off" the
state, and they blamed LHSRSA for allowing this to happen.
The deficit was embarrassing to LHSRSA and to the Division
of Health Maintenance and Ambulatory Patient Services (the

old Department of Health) which ran the program.

division was forced to admit publicly that

The

it had no idea

whether dentists were actually doing all of the work they
were charging to the state.

Later, the division made

matters worse by revising its estimate of how much would
be needed to cover the program's deficit.

Instead of

the original $^.7 million, the division now calculated it

would need only $2.6 million (of which approximately

$327,000 would be required from state funds).

30

Many

legislators, however, felt that if the division was wrong
about the first estimate, then it could also be mistaken
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about the revised estimate.

Legislative critics (including the new fiscal
officer) pointed out that the basic problem with the pro-

gram was that it was open-ended.

It gave dentists au-

thority to perform any work they felt was needed.

Thus,

one dentist even submitted a bill for working on thirty-

eight teeth of one child!

The division could not say

whether or not any of the work was ever done.
It

took several legislative appearances by the

LHSRSA commissioner and officials from the Division of

Health Maintenance and Ambulatory Patient Services, but
the legislature finally approved the deficit spending
for the program.

Legislators had gotten the oppor-

tunity to question LHSRSA officials and departmental
policy.

The legislative fiscal officer emphasized

that the division and LHSRSA would, in the future, have
to monitor the dental program more closely.

LHSRSA

officials agreed to do this, and they came up with

a

plan to have all dentists obtain permission before under-

taking any dental work on children.

However, the bottom

line was that the deficit spending was approved.

The

governor had wanted it, the commissioner of administration had appeared before the legislature in support of
it,

and LHSRSA had wanted it.

Although this is only one instance, it seems to
bereflect the type of relationship which is developing
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tween the legislature and LHSRSA.

The legislature wil]

question, investigate, and create newspaper headlines, but
at this stage in its development, the legislature does not

appear capable of doing much more than this.

Therefore,

for LHSRSA, the legislature remains a secondary consider-

ation in its political-administrative relationships.
Interest Groups, Clientele and LHSRSA
The most important interest group in health and

welfare matters has always been the medical profession
and the two medical schools in the state.

ization has not changed this.

The reorgan-

If one examines the 1973

reorganization closely, it is possible to see that the
dominance of the medical profession was assured from the
start.

Although the legislation did not specify that

the health-welfare commissioner must be a doctor, the

first three LHSRSA commissioners have been medical doctors

More importantly, those commissioners have also been

products of the same environment
complex.

-

the Tulane-LSU medical

Commissioner Mary had been director of Charity

Hospital before his appointment, and Commissioner William
Stewart was chancellor of LSU medical school before his

appointment.

After Dr. Stewart's resignation, there was

some suggestion that a professional administrator (the

implication was that he would also be from outside the
state) should be hired to run the department.

Instead,
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Dr.

William Cherry,

A

Tulane medical school graduate with

previous experience in the U.S. Public Health Service,
was chosen to head the huge umbrella department.
The legislation creating the umbrella department

called for the appointment of
board.

It

a

fifteen member advisory

specified that at least five of the members

of the advisory board had to be medical doctors, but
it made no provision for representation by recipients of

public welfare or health services.

Consequently, since

its inception, the LHSRSA advisory board has been domin-

ated by the medical profession.

The first advisory

board had five medical doctors, two dentists, and one

associate professor from the Tulane medical school.
The influence of the medical profession in the

umbrella department may have had something to do with
the maintenance of the state's public hospital program.
At a time when other states are phasing out their pub-

lic hospitals, Louisiana still maintains this expensive

system.

Since Tulane and LSU train their students at

Charity Hospital in New Orleans (as well as the other state
public hospitals), they have

a

definite stake in continu-

ing the system whatever the costs to the state.

As noted

earlier, it was Tulane and LSU that pushed for the formal

affiliation agreement with Charity Hospital.

And, it was

the ex-chancellor of LSU medical school, Dr. William

Stewart, who forced his Charity Hospital director to sign
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the agreement.

In 1976,

the LSU medical school branch

in Shreveport took over the entire operation
of the

state's second largest public hospital, Confederate

Memorial Medical Center. 33

Thus, it is obvious that the

medical profession in Louisiana considers the continued

operation of public hospitals financed by the state
government to be in its own best interests.

Those hos-

pitals provide the training ground for virtually all of
the state's doctors, and the state's two medical schools
(and most doctors in Louisiana are graduates of either of

these schools) have finally formalized this association

through the affiliation agreement.
What all of this indicates is that LHSRSA is

likely to find it easier to deal with the Tulane-LSU medical complex than with other professions in the department
or with other interest groups outside the medical field.

While this situation has not caused much dissension within the department,

could develop.

there is

a

good possibility that it

Frederick Mosher, in his book Democrac y

and the Public Service

,

speculates that:

...the most explosive situations in professionalized
public agencies arise between those in different professions (or segments) and in different personnel
systems who are approximately equal in level of responsibility and pay, but where one is "more elite"
than the other 3^
.

Each profession brings to the organization its own par-

ticular view of the world and the agency's role in

it.

When those professions are combined together under one

department, the result can be dissension over policy or
over relations" with clients.
A close

examination of the relations between

LHSRSA and its clients reveals the tensions that exist because of the dominance of the medical profession in the

department.

The legislation creating LHSRSA did not speci-

fy any official role for clientele of the department.

There was no provision that a certain number of the advisory board members be recipients of public assistance or

users of the other services offered by the department.
This should not be surprising in view of the fact that
it was the medical profession which was most influential

in drawing up the consolidation plan.

The traditional

doctor-patient relationship is one where the doctor is
assumed to know the best treatment to provide the patient.
The patient is expected to follow this treatment or seek
the services of another doctor.
The problem for LHSRSA and its doctor/commissioners is that the traditional doctor-patient relationship
is precisely what the department does not need.

Clients

of public assistance and health services have become more

demanding.

They want more services, better services,

and more convenient delivery of those services.

They also

the
are demanding a greater role in decision-making for

department.

They want representation on all departmental
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advisory boards, and they expect their opinions to be considered.

When their views do not receive prompt response

from departmental officials, the clients can be expected
to take more drastic action.

This happened when parents

of retarded and emotionally disturbed children did not

receive what they perceived to be fair treatment by the

health-welfare department and the state of Louisiana.
Those parents brought suit in federal court in order to
force the state to remove Louisiana children from sub-

standard Texas institutions.

The court eventually sided

with the parents and ordered the state to bring those

children back to Louisiana (where they were to be placed
in licensed facilities).

drew up

a

Under court order, the state

plan and began implementing it in 1976.

36

In the final analysis, although the department is

classified as

a

health and human resources agency, it tends

to emphasize the "health" aspect more than any other.

Welfare recipients do not have ready access to the commissioner's office.

Moreover, this situation can be ex-

pected to continue as long as the medical profession dominates the department.

The future may also bring more

client/department conflicts.

The likelihood is that, as

difMosher predicts, conflicts will also arise among the

ferent professions within the department.

In that event,

the medical proit should be interesting to see whether

department.
fession is able to retain control over the

Conclusions
The findings of this chapter show that there have

been some changes in the political-administrative rela-

tionships.

However, it is interesting to note that most

of these changes appear to be the consequences of other

factors in the political environment.
Two of the changes have occurred in the relation-

ships between the consolidated department and the legis-

lature and clientele groups.

Since the consolidated de-

partment was created, the state legislature has established the position of legislative fiscal officer.

His

function is to advise the legislature on fiscal and policy matters.
it

Although the position is still developing,

is already possible to see a greater tendency for the

legislature to question bureaucratic actions.

Another

change has come about in the views of the health-welfare
clients.

They are growing in their insistency and in

their vocal demands on state government.

One example

which illustrates this is the federal suit initiated by
the parents of exceptional children.

This ability of

clients to get redress from outside sources (principally
in the courts) has meant a changed relationship between

the umbrella department and its clientele.

Clients are

no longer content to be passive recipients of the depart-

ment's services.

They now want an active role in deter-
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mining the policy that affects them.
However, the most visible of the changes has been
in the management style of the governor.

It has been the

custom since Huey Long's time for Louisiana governors to
be actively concerned with health and welfare policy.

Edwin Edwards has gone beyond this.

Even though he took

office with no prior administrative experience, Edwards
has developed a very effective management style.

What

the governor has done is to broaden the role of the com-

missioner of administration, giving him almost carte
blanche authority to interfere in any administrative matter he deems necessary.

Since his appointment to the

position, Charles Roemer has used his authority extensively.

Sometimes he has interfered at the specific request

of the governor, but, quite often, he has done so on his

own initiative.

With respect to the umbrella department, both the

governor and the commissioner of administration have found
it necessary to involve themselves in the department's prob-

lems.

As this study has shown, the new department has ex-

perienced numerous problems organizing and operating the
programs under its control.

To the extent that reorgan-

ization has brought about these problems, one might then
conclude that it is the reorganization that has caused
and
the greater degree of involvement from the governor

the commissioner of administration.

Given the political

stake Governor Edwards has in achieving

a

successful re-

organization, it is understandable that he may have felt

compelled to devote more of his time to the problems

encountered by the health-welfare department.
In the final analysis,

it must be said that re-

organization was not quite the trauma that some people
expected.

The Louisiana reorganization case demonstrates

that the nature of a state's political-administrative

environment is constantly changing.

Ironically, there

probably would have been changes in political and administrative relationships even if there had been no reor-

ganization in 1973-

The changing political environment

in Louisiana would have forced the separate health and

welfare agencies to alter their relationships with other

political actors in the state.
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Two of the most important supporters of the reorganization were Dr. Charles Mary, who was then the head
of the Charity Hospital in New Orleans, and Dr. Ransom
K. Vidrine, the State Health Officer.

New Orleans Times-Picayune 27 March 1976, sec. 1,
p. 5; and 24 June 1976, sec. 1, p. 24.
Also see
Baton Rouge Morning Advocate 27 March 1976, sec. B,
p. 1; and Baton Rouge State Times
19 October 1976.
,

,

,

CHAPTER

V

THE EFFECTS OF THE 1973 REORGANIZATION ON THE

OUTPUTS OF THE HEALTH-WELFARE SYSTEM
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the sub-

stantive effectiveness of the 1973 Louisiana reorganization
on state policy in the health-welfare area.

Frederick Mosher, this involves judging

a

According to

reorganization

against the goals it was intended to accomplish.

1

Thus,

if a reorganization was supposed to achieve financial

savings for state government, then it would be judged by
how much savings had actually resulted.

Or,

if the reor-

ganization was supposed to improve services, then

it would

be judged by the type and the quality of the services it

now offers to its clients.

In the case of the 1973 Loui-

siana reorganization, any assessment of its impact would
have to begin by focusing on these two goals since these

were the most frequently mentioned goals during the re-

organization debate.
The Effect of Reorganization on Total Spending

Looking first at the claim for huge economies,

it

is impossible to see where these have actually resulted.

177
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As Table

4

shows, the budget for health-welfare has in-

creased from $520.5 million in fiscal 1972-73 to $910

million in fiscal 1977-78.

That represents a 7^.7% in-

crease during the first five years of the department's
existence.

Even after accounting for the effects of in-

flation, there is still a 17.65? increase in the depart-

ment's budget (see Table 5).

During that same period, the

number of employees in the health-welfare department increased from 17,357 to 26,887

(a

54.9% increase).

2

One possible area of savings for the state could
be in federal funding.

During the reorganization debate,

the supporters of the reorganization suggested that a con-

solidated department would be able to attract additional
federal funding.

This, they said, would then free state

revenues for other areas or would even permit
in state taxes.

a

reduction

But, here too the consolidation has not

lived up to its expectations.

Table

6

shows that total

federal funds expressed as a percentage of LHSRSA's

budget have decreased from 48.1* to 45.6% for the period
from 1972-73 to 1977-78.

Even using figures adjusted for

inflation, there has still been
funds.

a

decrease in federal

From 1972-73 to 1977-78, federal funds as

a

per-

centage of total LHSRSA expenditures have decreased from
48.1% to 46.7% (see Table 7).
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TABLE

6

COMPARISON OF FEDERAL AND STATE
EXPENDITURES AS PERCENT OF
TOTAL LHSRSA BUDGET

Fiscal
Year

State
Funds

Federal
Funds

1972- 73*
1973- 74
1974- 75
1975- 76
1976- 77
1977- 78

51.95s

48.1%
43.8%
41.2%
41.8%
47.3%
45.6%

56.2%
58.8%
58.2%
52.7%
54.4%

Source: Louisiana.
Executive Budget
1972-73 through 1977-78.
*See note for Tables

4

and

TABLE

Fiscal years

5.

7

COMPARISON OF FEDERAL AND STATE FUNDING TO LHSRSA
AFTER ADJUSTING FOR INFLATION

Fiscal
Year

State
Funds

Federal
Funds

1972- 73*
1973- 74
1974- 75
1975- 76
1976- 77
1977- 78

51.9%
55.7%
58.5%
57.5%
51.9%
53-3%

48.1%

Executive Budget
Louisiana.
Source:
1972-73 through 1977-78.

44

.

3%

41.5
42.3%
48.1%
46.7%

Fiscal years

Economic
Joint Economic Committee.
Congress.
Advisers.
Indicators by the Council of Economic
U.S.

,

^

182

TABLE 7- Continued

Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, January,
1

97 9

•

*See note for Tables

H

and

5.

While consolidation has not brought about the ex-

pected increases in federal funding, it is not possible
to blame the loss of federal funding on the consolidation.
On the contrary, the 1973 Louisiana reorganization came
at a time when federal funds for categorical programs

were declining.

The percentage decrease in federal funds

for Louisiana is probably a reflection of this phenomenon

rather than the effect of the recent consolidation

.

Based on the available data, one must conclude
that reorganization has not brought about huge savings

either in terms of reduction of the total budget or in
terms of additional federal funds which free state revenues
for other program areas.

Thus, once again it has been

demonstrated that the savings claim for reorganization
is not attainable unless state officials are willing to

cut established programs.

Since these are the programs

that usually have the strongest support from clientele,

interest groups, and agency employees, those program cuts
are rarely made.

Louisiana is no exception.
it

Throughout this study,

has been emphasized that there exists strong support

among many groups for the continuation of health and welfare

.
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programs.

This pressure appears intense enough to assure

continued expansion of the health-welfare budget even
while the governor and the legislature are worrying about
the decline in the state's severance tax revenues (the

biggest revenue source for the state of Louisiana).

Governor Edwards must have recognized this fact at an
early point because he has always tempered his predic-

tion of economies with the promise that services would
not be cut.

Also, despite the recent efforts of the

legislature to use the umbrella department in its fight
to gain independence from the governor, the legislature

has not made any drastic cuts in the department's budget.
It

continues to threaten such cuts, but, so far, these

threats have not been carried out.
The Effect of Reorganization on
Established Programs

As Table

8

indicates, certain program areas seem to

have benefited greatly from the reorganization.

The Divi-

sion of Management's budget has increased from $3,922,258
in 1972-73 to $18,361,876 in 1977-78

(an increase of 36-8%)

However, these figures do not reflect only administrative
services.

When only administrative services are consid-

ered, the increase is from $1,598,711 to $18,361,876.

That represents a

10W

increase.

After adjusting for the

effects of inflation, the increase is 6^1%, still

a very

.

:

.
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TABLE

8

COMPARISON OF BUDGET TOTALS
FOR DIVISIONS OF LHSRSA

Divisions

1972-73

Hosps a

$

^47,^1^,546

$

59,907,162

$

61,458,008

CHNO b

$

46,896,858

$

50,175,075

$

57,471,919

$

37,065,173

$

40,995,266

$

48,715,438

MR d

$

25,045,966

$

36,521,860

$

43,565,420

HS e

$

1,871,144

$

3,837,475

$

3,632,171

HM&APS f

$

18,690,153

$

21,986,204

$

31,135,806

IMS

$339,679,707

Admin h

$

YS 1

$

-0-

$

-0-

$

-0-

hr j

$

-0-

$

-0-

$

-0-

Rehab. k

$

-0-

$

-0-

$

-0-

.

MH

C

3,922,258

1973-74

$322,871,002
$

11,148,104

1974-75

$313,872,221
$

20,679,368

'

Source
Executive Budget
Louisiana
1972-73 through 1977-78.

Fiscal years

Notes a Abbreviat ion for Division of Hospitals.
total includes all functions for the division.

This

This
at New Orleans.
1977-78.
to
from
1972-73
81.4%
budget
division increased its

Abbreviation for Charity Hospital

Abbreviation for the Division of Mental Health.

It

increased its budget 56.6%.

Abbreviation for the Division of Mental Retardation.
It

increased its budget 108.9$.

Abbreviation for the Division of Human Services.
experienced a 502% budget increase.

It

.
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TABLE

1975-76

8

-

Continued

1976-77

1977-78

$

70,477,466

$

61,368,760

$

69,018,580

$

69,429,145

$

76,069,863

$

85,067,675

$

49,247,698

$

54,162,584

$

58,059,265

$

56,868,096

$

44,117,750

$

52,178,176

$

5,401,332

$

7,952,798

$

11,263,556

$

33,860,489

$

51,351,392

$

51,802,825

$413,760,652

$477,847,346

$508,856,569

$

27,003,421

$

15,618,167

$

18,361,876

$

9,707,282

$

11,035,313

$

6,339,170

$

-0-

$

479,408

$

545,060

$

-0-

$

45,967,133

$

48,442,792

Abbreviation for Division of Health Maintenance and
Ambulatory Patient Services (later changed to the DiviIts budget increased 177.2%.
sion of Health).
1

&Abbreviat ion for the Division of Income Maintenance
Its
(later changed to the Division of Family Services).
budget increased 49.8$.

Abbreviation for the Division of Management.
Abbreviation for the Division of Youth Services.

Abbreviation for the Division of Human Relations.
Abbreviation for the Division of Rehabilitation
Services
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significant increase for that division (see Table

9

for

the inflation adjusted figures for all of the department's

divisions).

There does not appear to be any other explan-

ation for this large increase except that reorganization
has affected the division's budget.

Given the nature of

the division's work and its role in helping to integrate
the various units of the department, one must conclude

that the consolidation was primarily responsible for the

increase in its budget.
Another division which has experienced

a

dramatic

increase in its budget is Charity Hospital at New Orleans.

Although not as dramatic as the increase for the Division
of Management, Charity Hospital's increase is still signi-

ficant.

Table

8

shows an Ql.H% increase for Charity Hospi-

tal, or a 17% increase in inflation adjusted dollars.

The full impact of this increase cannot be realized until it is compared with the increase for the remainder
of the state's general care public hospitals.

For the

same period, the percentage increase for the Division
of Hospitals is only 45.6$; however, after adjusting for

inflation, the figure is -6.1%, an actual decrease in
the budget for the Division of Hospitals.

In this par-

ticular case, there appears to be little doubt but that
the reorganization is partly responsible for this signi-

ficant difference in the budgets of these two divisions.

Veteran political observers in Louisiana have

.
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TABLE

9

COMPARISON OF BUDGET TOTALS FOR LHSRSA DIVISIONS
US.ING INFLATION ADJUSTED FIGURES

Divisions
Hosps

1972-73

*

1973-74

1974-75

$

47,414,546

$

53,015,188

$

49,562,910

CHNO

$

46,896,858

$

44 ,402,721

$

46,348,322

MH

$

37,065,173

$

36,278,996

$

39,286,644

MR

$

25,045,966

$

32,320,230

$

35,133,403

HS

$

1,871,144

$

3,395,996

$

2,929,170

HM&APS

$

18,690,153

$

19,456,818

$

25,109,521

IM

$339,679,707

Admin

$

YS

$

-0-

$

-0-

$

-0-

HR

$

-0-

$

-0-

$

-0-

Rehab

$

-0-

$

-0-

$

-0-

.

3,922,258

$285,726,550
$

9,865,579

Source: Louisiana.
Executive Budget
1972-73 through 1977-78.

.

$253,122,759
$

16,676,910

Fiscal years

Economic
U.S. Congress.
Joint Economic Committee.
Indicators by the Council of Economic Advisers.
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, January,
,

1979.

*For key to abbreviations, see the notes for Table

8.
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TABLE

1975-76

9

-

Continued

1976-77

1977-78

52,595,124

$

42,617,194

$

44

$

51,812,795

$

52,826,294

$

54,882,371

$

36,752,013

$

37,612,906

$

37,457,590

$

42,^38,878

$

30,637,326

$

33,663,339

,030,845

$

5,522,776

$

7,266,810

25,269,022

$

35,660,689

$

33,421,177

$

$

$

4

$308,776,606

$331,838,435

,

528 ,116

$328,294,561

20,151,807

$

10,845,949

$

11,846,372

244 ,240

$

7,663,412

$

4,089,787

$

-0-

$

332,923

$

351,652

$

-0-

$

31,921,620

$

31,253,414

$
$

7

,

long noted that Charity Hospital in New Orleans was

treated like the state's stepchild when it came to appropriations.

LHSRSA's first commissioner, Dr. Charles Mary,

had been director of Charity Hospital prior to his appoint-

ment to the commissioner's post.

He often noted that as

Charity's director he had experienced frustration in

getting the state to fund the hospital.

When Charity

briefly lost its accreditation in 1975, the reason most
often cited was the long years of neglect by the state

.

government
Why was Charity Hospital neglected for so
long?
The answer seems to be that Charity Hospital was
too

completely identified as

a

New Orleans institution.

It

was governed by its own board, and the State Department
of Hospitals had no formal control over it.

years, there has been

a

In past

pronounced bias on the part of

non-New Orleans legislators towards anything that might
benefit the city.

Since Charity primarily served the

city's large black population, rural white legislators
found even less reason to support its budget requests.

With the reorganization, however, Charity Hospital
was brought under the control of the new umbrella depart-

ment.

No longer was its governing body located in New

Orleans.

Its problems now became part of the problems

confronting the new department.

Thus, the reorganization

gave non-New Orleans legislators less reason to deny the

hospital's budget requests.

An additional factor account-

ing for the large increase can be attributed to the changing attitudes of state legislators.

Because they now

have large black constituencies in their own districts,

they are much more inclined to vote increases for Charity

Hospital.

Some of their rural black constituents may

end up receiving medical care at Charity.

legislators now have

a

Thus, rural

stake in seeing that Charity's

services are maintained and improved.

This may become

190

even more significant given the gradual phasing out of
some of the smaller rural hospitals in the state.

With respect to the budget increases for other

divisions, it is not clear whether these are the result
of the reorganization.

It

seems likely that other factors

are primarily responsible for some of the increases.

For

instance, the 108$ increase for the Division of Mental

Retardation (35.3% after adjusting for the effects of inflation) probably reflects the pressure that has been ap-

plied to state government since 197^

•

Operators of pri-

vate residential treatment centers for the mentally re-

tarded and emotionally disturbed children, parents' groups,
and the media have pressured the state government to in-

crease its capabilities for housing the state's emotionally disturbed and mentally retarded children.

As noted,

the state had been sending these children to out-of-state

private institutions (mostly in Texas) and paying very
high costs for their upkeep.^

After revelations showing

that many of these institutions provided substandard care,

parents forced the state to bring these children back to
Louisiana.

In order for the state to do this, it was

first necessary to upgrade many of the state's residential

treatment facilities already in operation.

This accounts

for some of the large increases in the Division of Mental

Retardation's budget.

It also accounts for the creation

Rehabilitation
of one of the state's newest divisions -
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Services.

The latter division was established
in 1976

and is responsible for providing services
to the mentally
and physically handicapped.
Included among the programs
the division operates is the "Exceptional
Children's Act."
The purpose of this program is to provide
financial assist-

ance to the families of exceptional children for
the cost
of boarding and/or therapy in a private residential
treat-

ment facility when a state facility is not available.
In 1977,

act.

over 2,000 children received services under the

6

Two other divisions which have experienced great

budget increases are the divisions of Health and Human
Services.

The Division of Health had a 177% increase

(79% after adjusting for inflation), and the Division of

Human Services had
for inflation).

a

502% increase (288% after adjusting

However, in both cases the budget increases

appear to be related to factors other than the recent reorganization.

The most likely factor is the increase in

the social services provided by the divisions.

The Divi-

sion of Human Services provides services primarily to the

aged population of the state.

Its services include adult

day-care, homemaker services, and "meals on wheels."
The Division of Health has expanded its social services
in the area of family planning.

After the state took over

the family planning program from the defunct Family Health

Foundation, the program was given to the Division of Health
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to administer.

Some of the division's budget increases

can be accounted for by this program's addition.

More-

over, the health division has also expanded its medical

services, including the Early Periodic Screening, Diagnosis
and Treatment Program.

Policy Changes Since Reorganization
A

careful analysis of Tables

data show that there has been

a

8

and

9

plus other

subtle shift in policy

emphasis in the umbrella department.

As indicated in

previous chapters, the department has always had
in favor of providing hospital services.

^

a

bias

This is in

large measure due to the orientation of the three suc-

cessive commissioners as well as to the well-established
nature of the state's public hospital system.

With re-

spect to the latter, Louisiana's persistence in such

a

policy goes counter to the trend in other parts of the
country.

In recent years,

state and local governments

have experienced decreasing bed occupancy rates in their

public hospitals.

Since the outset of the federal govern-

ment's medical assistance program, patients have chosen
to enter private facilities rather than state operated

hospitals.

Part of the reason for this may lie in the

are not
fact that in state operated hospitals, patients

allowed to choose their own physicians.

However, under

patient has
the federal medical assistance program, the
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that choice.

Louisiana has also experienced this decline in
patient population in its public hospitals.

The average

daily occupancy rate for all state general care public

hospitals (excluding Charity Hospital in New Orleans)
was 59.7% in fiscal 1964-65.

Charity Hospital's occupano

cy rate for the same period was 76.2%.

When these figures

are added to the rising cost of medical care in the state

hospitals, the picture is not promising.

Data show that

state hospital costs have risen from $23.89 (average cost

per unit of service) in 1964-65 to $83.79 in 1973-74.

q

That represents a 250% increase in ten years.
The problem in Louisiana is that the state's public

hospital system is well-entrenched politically.

The sys-

tem is part of the legacy of Longism, and it is no accident
that two of the hospitals bear the Long name in their

title.

With these political pressures and the orientation

of the LHSRSA commissioners, change has come slowly to

Louisiana.

Yet, changes are apparent.

In fiscal 1957-58,

the average daily patient popu-

lation was 3,192, and the number of beds in use was 46l6
(the occupancy rate was 69. 2%).

10

As Table 10 shows,

the bed capacity of the state's public hospital system

had dropped to 2666 by 1976.

$122.44.

The cost of these beds was

Table 11 gives the figures for all of the state

hospitals except Charity Hospital.

Significantly, it
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TABLE 10
TRENDS IN OCCUPANCY FOR THE
STATE GENERAL HOSPITALS
.

Year

Average
Daily
Patients

Bed
Capacity

Occupancy

1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977?
1978 b

2,021
2,224
2,210
2,364
2,318
1,812
1,696
1,747
1,758

2,853
3,255
3,165
3,361
3,387
2,608
2,666
2,674
2,827

70.8
68.3
69.8
70.3
68.4
69.5
63.6
65.3
62.2

%

Source:
Louisiana.
Executive B udget.
1972-73 through 1978-79.
a Estimated figures

Average
Cost Per
Unit

$

n .a.

$

67.60

$

714.18

77.17
62.61
$108.21
$122.40
$130.32
$139.97

$
$

Fiscal years

for 1977.

Figures included in the governor's budget recommendations for fiscal year 1978-79.
TABLE 11

TRENDS IN OCCUPANCY FOR THE
STATE GENERAL HOSPITALS
(EXCLUDING CHARITY HOSPITAL)

Year

Average
Daily'
Patients

Bed
Capacity

1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975

669
894
927
1,057
1,031
689

1,105
1,423
1,455
1,741
1,745
1,185

/o

Occupancy

60.

5

62.8
63.7
60.7
59-1
58.1

1"',

'ABLK

J

Average

Year

Da i

]

y

Patients
1976
1977a
1978^

67^
705
738

1

-

Continued

Bed
Capacity

Occupancy

,166
1,174
1,327

57.8
60.1
55.6

%

1

Executive Budget
Louisiana.
Source:
years 1972-73 through 1978-79.
a Estimated

.

Fiscal

figures for 1977.

^Figures included in the governor's budget recommendations for fiscal year 1978-79shows expected occupancy for 1978-79 at 55.6%.

Thus, these

figures confirm that the state's public hospital system is
still losing patients.

These figures also seem to suggest

that the system may bo "winding down" gradually.

The recent

increases in the budget for Charity Hospital may in fact
reflect this trend.

As the smaller state hospitals are

being phased out, the largest ones will be improved.

This

improvement obviously does not include much expansion of
bed capacity.

Rather, it seems to be directed at improving

the existing services offered by the hospitals.

For in-

its satstance, Charity Hospital has recently expanded

ellite clinic program.

The concept of this program is to

that patients do
locate clinics on a city-wide basis so
to receive free medical
not have to come into center city
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services.

The satellite clinics are equipped to handle

most minor medical services, but major services continue
to be provided at Charity Hospital.
It should be noted that as the state phases out

its hospital services, it has been increasing its services
in the area of preventive care.

An example of this is

the Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic and Treatment

Program offered by the Division of Health.
With respect to the effect of the reorganization
on the outputs in the public assistance program, the pic-

ture is very confusing.

In 197^, the Supplemental Secur-

ity Income Program (SSI) went into effect across the
country.-'"-'-

The new program provides for federal takeover

of three categorical assistance programs: Old Age Assist-

ance (OAA), Aid to the Needy Blind (ANB), and Aid to the

Permanently and Totally Disabled (APTD).

Under the new

program, the federal government administers these three

categories of assistance, and it also establishes national

eligibility standards.

12

With the elimination of OAA, ANB, and APTD, the
state now administers only two categorical assistance programs: Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and

General Assistance (GA).

velopment would see

a

One might expect that this de-

decrease in the budget for the Di-

vision of Family Services (which administers the state's
one
welfare program), and this, in fact, has happened if

3

considers the figures adjusted for the effects
of inflation.

The actual percentage decrease for the Division
of

Family Services is -3.4%.
What has happened to the division's budget is that
the amount budgeted for public assistance has decreased

because of the SSI program.

However, the amount budgeted

for administrative services in the division has shown an

increase.

1J

An examination of this increase reveals it

to be in the social services now provided by the division.

One of the fastest growing areas is the adult social serv-

ices programs.
at

In 1974,

adult social services were funded

$4.1 million in state and federal funds.

Approxi-

mately ^32 employees (including both clerical and professional workers) staffed the individual programs.

It

is

interesting to note that there is considerable overlap between these social services and those offered by the Di-

vision of Human Services.

Both divisions now have exten-

sive social services for the elderly.

Their programs in-

clude: home delivered meals, day-care centers and home-

maker services.

So far, there has been no attempt by the

LHSRSA commissioner to eliminate this program duplication.
In fact,

the presence of the overlap is itself still more

evidence of the continuing lack of integration in the
department.

If the commissioner really had complete con-

trol over his department, he would not have allowed these

duplicating programs to develop.
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ConcI usions
In the final analysis, the 1973 health-welfare

reorganization did not produce the financial savings predicted by its supporters.

Data show that the budget for

the health-welfare umbrella department has increased each

year since the reorganization went into effect.

The num-

ber of personnel employed by the department has also in-

creased

.

Contrary to the expectations of the proponents
of the reorganization, there has been no great increase
in federal funds allocated to the department.

This does

not necessarily indicate that the consolidation arrange-

ment is not an appropriate organizational structure for

attracting federal funds.

It only reflects the fact that

categorical programs have decreased since 1973 when the

Louisiana reorganization went into effect.

Thus, there

are not as many federal programs for which the new depart-

ment can apply.
As the data indicate, there have been several sig-

nificant budget increases within the department.

While

it is not possible to say with certainty how much of these

increases is due to the reorganization, there is some

reason to believe that the increases for Charity Hospital and the Division of Management are related to the

reorganization.

The latter unit has been used by LHSRSA
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commissioners in their effort to gain control over this
large department.

The consolidation of Charity Hospita]

under LHSRSA's umbrella seems to have removed from it the
stigma of being "a New Orleans institution."

Although

there may be other factors relative to the increases for

Charity, it seems apparent that some of the increase is
a

result of the new organizational arrangement.
It also appears that there has been a slight

policy shift since the reorganization went into effect.

Although the medical profession still seems firmly in
control of the department, there has been
from public hospital care.

a

shift away

To a large extent, this simply

reflects national trends in hospital services.

However,

since all of the state's public hospitals are now under
one department, the state is in a much better position
to coordinate the remaining hospital services offered by

the department.

This chapter has also noted that there has been
a steady decrease in the number of beds and the occupancy

rate at most state operated public hospitals.

Yet, the

number of beds and the occupancy rate for Charity Hospital
have remained somewhat stable.

Charity Hospital's future

asseems assured because of its size, but another factor
in the
suring Charity's continued existence is its role

training of the state's doctors.

The affiliation agree-

medical schools
ment between Charity Hospital and the two
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seems to guarantee the continued existence of Charity even
as the state closes other hospitals.

The other significant policy trend can be seen in

the area of social services.

Currently, several divisions

of the umbrella department are involved in the provision
of social services.

These divisions include: Health,

Family Services, Human Services and Rehabilitation Services.

There is some overlap among these social services

programs, and the prospect for the future may include
serious management problems in this area as the overlapping
and duplication grow worse.
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"CHAPTER

VI

WHAT DID REORGANIZATION IN LOUISIANA
ACTUALLY ACCOMPLISH?
Like so many other state reorganizations, the

Louisiana reorganization did not fulfill the great promises of its supporters.

It

did not result in huge fi-

nancial savings for the state.

On the contrary, as this

chapter has shown, the state's health and welfare programs
are costing the taxpayers more today than before the re-

organization went into effect.

Furthermore, reorganiza-

tion has not helped the state accumulate larger amounts
of federal aid funds.

It had been

reorganization debate that

a

speculated during the

consolidated department would

be in a better position to attract federal funds.

Pro-

ponents of the reorganization argued that consolidation
would provide

a

better utilization of available state

funds to attract federal money.

What had not been antici-

pated was that the federal government would greatly cut
back on the number of its categorical grant programs.
Thus, no matter what organizational arrangement the state

had devised, there would still be fewer federal grants

available in the health-welfare area.
With respect to the degree of integration achieved
203

20^

by reorganization, the results are also less
than were

expected.

Traditional reorganization literature suggests

that reorganization will produce a department in which
the basic operating units are totally integrated into the

whole.

One factor in achieving this objective is adequate

management tools for the department head.

Without these

tools, the department head would be hard pressed to co-

ordinate the activities of the units placed under his
control.

As already noted in this study, the commissioner

of the Louisiana umbrella department has developed many
of these management tools.

Through the efforts of the

second commissioner, Dr. William Stewart, the Division
of Management has become an important force assisting

the commissioner in trying to control his department.

Despite these advances in management functions,
the job of integrating fully the programs and functions
of the department remains unfinished.

One of the more

successful actions of the commissioner has been in the
area of public hospitals.

Under the 1973 reorganization,

the Department of Hospitals and the huge Charity Hospital

complex in New Orleans were combined under one department.

In retrospect, this consolidation had important

policy implications for the state.

The national trend

has been for public hospitals to be gradually phased out
of operation, but Louisiana was committed to maintaining
alan expensive state operated system that was financed
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most totally with state money.

Since the 1973 reorgan-

ization went into effect, some policy changes have been
evident.

The smaller rural hospitals are' slowly being

phased out, and Charity Hospital has undergone

a

major

overhaul in its buildings, its management, and its
services.

These changes were certainly long overdue.

The state had allowed the huge hospital to deteriorate
to the point where its accreditation was in jeopardy.

The consolidation arrangement seemed to facilitate the

state's coming to grips with the problems in its hospital

Reorganization lessened the identity of Charity

system.

as a New Orleans institution and also eased the closing

of hospital beds at smaller rural hospitals.

The role of the first three commissioners of the

umbrella department in this policy change has been pivotal.
Each of the commissioners has been
LSU medical complex.

a

product of the Tulane-

Given this background, it is not

surprising that they have concentrated

a

good deal of their

efforts on the problems of the hospital system.

Their

backgrounds probably also account for the relative ease
with which the state's medical profession has accepted
these changes.
One area where there has been much less success
in integrating programs and policies is in the social

services.

Most of the increases in the social services

programs have come only since 1973-

Because of the new-
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ness of the program area, one might have expected the um-

brella department to achieve
services system.

a

more coordinated social

It has not done so,

however.

Social

services programs are duplicated among several different

divisions within the umbrella department.
This situation may be the result of the preoccupa-

tion of the department's commissioners with health problems.

It may also be the result of the commissioners'

medical backgrounds.

One certainly has to wonder what

would have happened if any or all of the department's

commissioners had been professional administrators.
Would that have made a difference?

Would there have been

better integration of the social services?

Would

a

pro-

fessional administrator have been better able to handle
the numerous management problems that have arisen since

1973?

Would a professional administrator have become em-

broiled in

a

public dispute with the governor?

On the other hand, one must also wonder whether

the Tulane-LSU medical interests and the medical profes-

sion would have been as cooperative with the umbrella de-

partment if

a

professional administrator had been chosen

to run the department.

Would they have fought to exempt

Charity and the other state hospitals from the reorganization?
Finally, there is the nagging question whether
large consolidation was actually warranted.

a

Granted the
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agencies consolidated in 1973 were in the general area
of
health and welfare, but is that adequate justification
for their inclusion under one giant umbrella department?
Is it possible that a department as large as the Louisiana

health-welfare department is really too large for one person to control?

Is it possible that full integration of

the department's programs will always remain an unachieve-

able goal?
The failure of the 1973 reorganization to live
up to its high expectations illustrates the problem facing

the state reorganization movement.

That problem is that

state reorganizations do not achieve all their proponents

predict for them.

Reorganization has not made state govern-

ment more manageable; nor has reorganization improved
state services.

And, in spite of the predictions, state

reorganization does not save money.
opposite is true!

In fact,

just the

Studies have shown that government ex-

penditures actually increase after the adoption of

organization

a re-

.

So who benefits from reorganization?

Certainly

the politicians who use reorganization as part of their

election campaigns do benefit in the short run.

But,

Does it really make any difference

who else benefits?

whether reorganization occurs or not?
The answer to the last question is: Yes, reorgan-

ization does make

a

difference.

Even though the Louisiana
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reorganization fell short of its goals, one must acknowledge
that there have been some benefits from it.

One of those

benefits has been in giving the state some needed reorganization experienced.

As previously noted in this study,

Louisiana's experience with administrative reorganization
was limited and politically controversial.

Thus, the

1973 reorganization gave the state a working knowledge
of the problems encountered in restructuring the admin-

istrative system.

This was especially useful after the

new state constitution (197*0 mandated reorganization
of the entire state government.

Rather than adopt

a re-

organization plan immediately, the state proceeded very
cautiously.

If the 1973 reorganization had taught any-

thing, it was that implementation of

a

reorganization

plan is just as important as formulating it.
In order to ensure the full implementation of the

mandated reorganization plan, the legislature established
a

special reorganization committee.

powered to formulate

a

The latter was em-

reorganization which would carry

out the constitutional mandate.

More importantly, the

committee also had the power to monitor the implementation
of the plan to ensure that economies would result.

Using

many
that authority, the reorganization committee held

new departmeetings with the secretary-designates of the

ments.

in with
The secretaries were instructed to come

cuts.
plans for achieving budget and personnel

Those who

failed to do so were informed that if they did not come
up with better plans, the committee itself would draw up

an implementation plan and submit it to the legislature

for its approval.

In most cases, the secretaries got the

message and came into committee meetings with acceptable
plans for achieving economies.
The 1973 reorganization plan also served as

catalyst for reevaluating health-welfare policy.

a

Pre-

viously, health and welfare policy were principally the

domain of the professional groups involved in providing
the services, the governor, and some interested legislators.

Once Governor Edwards proposed his plan, this

placed health-welfare policy on the public agenda.

Other

interest groups, legislators, the news media, and recipients of services became involved in voicing their opinions

about the adequacy or inadequacy of the state's health
and welfare services.

Thus, one byproduct of a reorgan-

ization may be its ability to shake things up

-

to cause

more public discussion and perhaps even to stimulate policy change.

The prospect that reorganization can stimulate

policy change is important to the governor.

The litera-

ture on the modern state governor suggests that the governor is often placed in the position of responding to bu-

reaucratic actions.

However, proposing a reorganization

offers him the opportunity to set the agenda.

Whether
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policy changes the governor wants are ever achieved may
not, in the final analysis, be as important to him as the

fact that the state bureaucracy was forced to respond to

one of his initiatives.

For Governor Edwards, the 1973 reorganization
held some special benefits.

During the 1971-72 governor's

race, he had campaigned on a platform to reform the state

government.

Once in office, Edwards was able to fulfill

that promise.

adoption of

He achieved both reorganization and the

a new

state constitution, and in achieving

these, he also succeeded in building
he could run for reelection.

a

record on which

In addition, Edwards'

cham-

pioning of reorganization had important political benefits
among certain segments of the state's population.
the disadvantaged, Edwards'

For

support of more health and

welfare services symbolized his commitment to the welfare
of the state's needy.

The fact that Edwards also chose

to appoint so many blacks to important positions in the

new department was also significant.

It

symbolized the

governor's commitment to greater black participation in
state government.

From a practical standpoint, the ap-

pointment of so many blacks to these key positions cemented
the governor's support in the black community.

That could

have been very important to the governor in his reelection
bid.

Finally, for the middle class taxpayers, the gover-

nor's reorganization proposal symbolized his concern with

the rising costs of government services.

Even though

Governor Edwards, never achieved those savings, he derived
some political benefit from his effort.
To summarize, reorganization has had important

consequences for Louisiana.

It

has given the governor

additional leverage in dealing with the state bureaucracy.
It

has allowed a reassessment of health-welfare policy,

and it has permitted this reassessment to take place in
full public view.

This has allowed greater participation

from all segments of the state's population in the making
of state health and welfare policy.

Reorganization has

also had significant symbolic effect on those segments
of the population seeking more services and lower taxes.

Thus, in the final analysis, the truth of the Louisiana

reorganization seems to lie somewhere between the idealistic model postulated by the reformers and the cynical

appraisal of the political skeptics.

The 1973 health-

welfare reorganization did matter: to the governor, to
the legislature, to interest groups, to clientele, and
to the general public.

No one who has observed Louisiana

politics during the Edwards' administration could dispute
this.

And, because reorganization has mattered to some

political actors, the likelihood is that the state will,
in the future, reorganize again.

.
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